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ABSTRACT 
Past domestic catastrophic disasters have required massive Department of 
Defense (DoD) Title 10 involvement.  During Hurricanes Andrew and Katrina, DoDs 
initial response, although critical, was criticized as slow.  The increased risks to the 
United States of cataclysmic events have solidified DoDs mandatory response to future 
events.  This has punctuated the importance of DoDs initial response capability.  
Historically, DoDs response to catastrophic disasters was instantaneous.  This was in part 
due to the strong relationships they maintained with State and local civil authorities.  This 
thesis examines how the once strong relationship between DoD and State civil authorities 
deteriorated over the years contributing to DoDs slow initial response to Hurricanes 
Andrew and Katrina.  Changes to disaster statutes, doctrine, and authoritative policies 
along with a contentious debate over the DoDs role in the domestic disaster arena have 
aided in deteriorating their relationship.  The thesis explores what can be done to reverse 
the trend and build a collaborative relationship between DoD and State civil authorities.  
It concludes by setting forth findings and recommendations focused on creating 
relationship building mechanisms between the DoD and State civil authorities aimed at 
improving DoD initial response for the next catastrophic disaster. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
Past catastrophic disasters, such as Hurricanes Andrew and Katrina required 
massive Department of Defense (DoD) Title 10 involvement.  During those cataclysmic 
events, DoDs response was critical.  It provided desperately needed capabilities and 
resources to overwhelmed State and local emergency responders.  When, and if, Title 10 
disaster response is immediate, structured, organized, and well integrated during a 
catastrophic event, it can mean the difference between life and death for many disaster 
victims.  When Title 10 response is slow, disorganized, and not integrated during the first 
few days of a disaster, it can also mean the difference between life and death.  Title 10 
forces must be ready to respond to catastrophic disasters and States must be willing to ask 
for DoD assistance if needed. 
Once DoD Title 10 forces are called, there is little to no time for State civil and 
DoD authorities to “spin-up” on rules of engagement (ROE).  Nor is it the time to attempt 
to get a better understanding of how the military will integrate its resources into a State’s 
emergency management and response system.  Therefore, it is critical that a collaborative 
relationship exist between State civil authorities and DoD Title 10 forces.  As one local 
emergency manager stated, “An emergency is a lousy time to be exchanging business 
cards.”1 Past experiences echo this sentiment.  Take this quote from a doctor who 
experienced the chaos of the 1906 San Francisco earthquake.  She stated, “The division 
of authority between army and municipality brought some terrible results…The military 
was called in to take partial command; the citizens did not know whom they were to 
obey.  And certainly the military subordinates and guards were not made to understand 
the limits of their authority.  The consequences were tragic.”2 
                                                 
1 Ozzie E. Paez, Co-author of “An Exploratory Study of Local Emergency Managers’ Views of 
Military Assistance/Defense Support to Civil Authorities (MACA/DSCA)”, Telephone Interview by 
author, 17 April 2007. 
2 Philip L. Fradkin, The Great Earthquake and Firestorms of 1906. Berkley, CA: University of 
California Press, 2005, 65. 
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In August of 1992, when Hurricane Andrew struck the gulf coast, a military after 
action report stated that a faster response by the military was needed and that gridlock at 
all levels of government delayed massive response efforts by two-three days.3 Thirteen years 
later, in August of 2005, as Hurricane Katrina made landfall, similar uncertainty as to the 
military’s role ensued, “As local, state, and federal governments responded in the days 
following Katrina, confusion surfaced as to what responsibilities the military has [had] 
and what capabilities it would provide in planning and responding to a catastrophic 
event.”4 This confusion was apparent at the highest levels in DoD and State civil 
authorities. 
Fortunately for most citizens, a majority of disasters never require DoD Title 10 
assistance.  Disaster response in the United States is structured so that disasters are 
handled at the lowest possible level.  Towns and cities throughout the United States have 
over two million first responders5 trained and ready to provide the first line of response.  If 
local resources are overwhelmed, then county and State civil assistance will be at the 
ready.  If the State civil resources are overwhelmed, then the States will employ National 
Guard assets.  If the Guard assets aren’t enough, then the State will call on their 
Emergency Management Assistance Compacts (EMAC) with other States to bolster their 
responses.  In the event more resources are needed, the States will ask for the federal 
government’s assistance.  In extreme cases, the Governor will ask the President to bring 
to bear the resources and capability of DoD title 10 forces. 
This bottom-up layered response is designed to provide immediate assistance by 
those most familiar with the people and the area.  Help is only to be given by outsiders 
when asked.  Unfortunately, this method of waiting to respond until asked has been 
problematic during catastrophic disasters.  This has been especially true during DoD Title 
10 catastrophic disaster response in support of States.  During Hurricane Andrew and 
                                                 
3 Department of the Army, Forces Command Hurricane Andrew Response: JTF Andrew AAR, 
Washington DC: Department of the Army, 16 November 1992, 4-5. 
4 United States Government Accountability Office, Hurricane Katrina: Better Plans and Exercises 
Needed to Guide the Military’s Response to Catastrophic Natural Disasters, Washington DC: United 
States Government Accountability Office, 15 May 2006, 1. 
5 "Supporting First Responders Strengthening Homeland Security," Homeland Security Site, January 
24, 2002 http://www.dhs.gov/xnews/releases/press_release_0048.shtm accessed 12 November 2006. 
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Hurricane Katrina states did not know what disaster response capabilities DoD Title 10 
possessed.  In addition, they were hesitant in asking for DoD assistance.  As for DoD 
Title 10 forces, they did not anticipate having to respond.  During both catastrophes, 
although heroic, these factors resulted in a slow DoD Title 10 response in the first few 
critical days of each disaster.  Tragically, a slow response by any agency can lead to dire 
consequences.  These tragic consequences are exemplified by Aaron Broussard’s, 
president of Jefferson Parish, sad recollection on September 4, 2005 of one heartbreaking 
event.  He told of an elderly woman who during Hurricane Katrina was trapped in a 
nursing home waiting for someone to rescue her.  Every day the elderly woman called her 
son, “….and said, "Are you coming, son?  Is somebody coming?"  And he said, "Yeah, 
Mama, somebody's coming to get you.  Somebody's coming to get you on Tuesday. 
Somebody's coming to get you on Wednesday.  Somebody's coming to get you on 
Thursday.  Somebody's coming to get you on Friday."  And she drowned Friday night.  
She drowned Friday night.”6 
After Hurricane Katrina, a number of reports and investigations were prompted to 
discover what went wrong and how to improve response prior to the next catastrophic 
disaster.  One Congressional report listed 186 findings.7 Another report issued by the 
White House listed 17 “Hurricane Katrina Critical Challenges” and made 125 
recommendations for improvement.8 Many of the findings and recommendations were 
aimed at improving DoD response.  This prompted DoD and DHS through United States 
Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) and the Federal Emergency Management Agency 
(FEMA), respectively, to intensify their relationships in order to improve DoD Title 10 
domestic response capabilities. 
                                                 
6 “Transcript from an interview with Michael Chertoff, Marc Morial, Mike Tidwell, Mark Fischetti, 
David Wessel, Haley Barbour, and Aaron Broussard,” Meet the Press, September 4, 2005 
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/9179790/ accessed 5 October 2007. 
7 United States Senate, Hurricane Katrina a Nation Still Unprepared: Special Report of the Committee 
on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, Washington DC: United States Senate, May 2006 
http://hsgac.senate.gov/_files/Katrina/FullReport.pdf accessed 4 August 2007, 589-605. 
8 The White House, The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina - Lessons Learned, Washington DC: 
The White House, February 2006, http://www.whitehouse.gov/reports/katrina-lessons-learned/ accessed 6 
August 2007, 51, 87. 
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DoD and DHS acted upon many of the post Katrina report recommendations.  
They increased formal interagency interaction, planning and exercises, and made 
increasing efforts to understand civil support operations and gain a better feel for each 
others capabilities and limitations.  An example of this was DoD, in coordination with 
FEMA, placing a “Defense Coordinating Officer (DCO) - typically deployed as lead field 
coordinator for the DoD at the time of a disaster - in each of FEMA's ten regional offices 
for ongoing preparedness and response coordination in disasters.”9 This provided DoD 
with the ability to more efficiently assess and act upon any impending or in progress 
disasters.  In addition it gave greater visibility to FEMA officials as to what capabilities 
DoD could provide.  Co-locating the DCOs on a full time basis in FEMA regional offices 
assisted in bridging coordination and communication issues.  These steps were good 
examples of how the DoD and Federal authorities began improving their relationships by 
collaborating in an effort to avoid future tragedies such as those witnessed after Katrina. 
Regrettably, the same can not be said for State civil authorities and DoD.  This is 
despite a post Katrina finding that cited issues between State civil authorities and DoD.  
One such issue was that of the role of the military in disaster response and who would be 
in charge of Title 10 and National Guard troops when they responded to the next 
catastrophic disaster.  The Katrina report stated that the issue over who’s in charge 
“…may have slowed the active duty military response and contributed to tension in the 
state-federal relationship.”10 Years after Katrina, tension still exists between DoD and 
State civil authorities over who’s in control.  Therefore it is critical to find ways to 
remove the tension between State civil authorities and DoD Title 10 forces and build a 
collaborative disaster response relationship.  Doing so will be a step in the right direction 
towards improving DoD Title 10 response for the next catastrophic disaster. 
                                                 
9 Federal Emergency Management Agency, Ready for 2006 Hurricane Season, Washington DC, 
Federal Emergency Management Agency, April 12, 2006 
http://www.fema.gov/news/newsrelease.fema?id=25061 accessed 10 April 2007. 
10 House of Representatives, A Failure of Initiative: Final Report of the Select Bipartisan Committee 
to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina, Washington DC, U.S. House of 
Representatives, February 15, 2006, 222. 
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B. RESEARCH QUESTION AND PURPOSE 
This thesis examines: what can be done to build a collaborative relationship 
between DoD and State civil authorities so that DoD Title 10 response can be improved 
for the next catastrophic disaster?  It argues that it is critical for DoD Title 10 forces and 
State civil authorities to build a collaborative response relationship.  In order to establish 
a context for their relationship, this thesis examines the historical evolution of the 
relationship between Title 10 forces and State civil authorities.  It identifies the distinct 
phases through which this relationship has undergone and analyzes how and why the 
relationship evolved from one of collaboration to ambiguity.  This thesis then examines 
the Title 10 response to Hurricanes Andrew and Katrina and analyzes how the 
relationship between Title 10 forces and State civil authorities slowed DoDs response.  In 
addition, it examines how post Katrina debates over the military’s role in disaster 
response have worsened an already tenuous relationship focusing more on who is in 
control if DoD responds rather than how to improve their response.  Finally, this thesis 
presents findings that explore reasons why DoD Title 10 and State civil authorities do not 
currently have a collaborative domestic disaster response relationship.  It offers policy 
recommendations based on those findings aimed at improving the historically complex 
relationship.  This is done with hopes that those recommendations, if implemented, may 
be used to improve DoD Title 10 response before the next catastrophic disaster. 
C. THESIS OUTLINE 
This thesis is organized into five chapters.  The current chapter sets the stage by 
providing a problem statement, posing a research question, and establishing the purpose 
of the thesis.  It also summarizes each of the five thesis chapters and contains a literature 
review to establish DoDs Title 10 civil support role in domestic disasters and its 
connection to State civil authorities. 
Chapter II emphasizes the criticality of building a collaborative response 
relationship between DoD Title 10 forces and State civil authorities.  This is based on 
research that illustrates the potential for greater DoD Title 10 involvement in domestic 
disaster response due to the ever increasing risk future catastrophic disasters.  The 
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National Planning Scenarios, the 2007 National Intelligence Estimate, and data 
concerning natural disasters are examined to illustrate this point. 
Chapter III is divided into four historical phases that trace the Federal military’s 
role in domestic disaster response.  It sheds insight on the changing domestic response 
role of the Federal military and examines how and why the response relationship between 
the military and State civil authorities slowly transformed from collaboration to 
ambiguity contributing to DoDs eventual slow response to Hurricane Andrew.  This is 
done by analyzing the Federal military response to a variety of past disasters and by 
examining the impact legislative and doctrinal changes have made on the relationship 
over the years. 
Chapter IV examines DoD Title 10 initial response to Hurricanes Andrew and 
Katrina.  It describes DoDs heroic efforts and contributions and also examines their 
response shortfalls.  Specifically, it examines why DoDs response was characterized as 
slow and how the relationship between DoD and State civil authorities contributed to a 
slow response.  Finally, chapter IV analyses how post Katrina debates over the military’s 
role in disaster response have worsened an already tenuous relationship focusing more on 
who is in control if DoD responds rather than how to improve their response.  It does so 
by establishing how the debate began post Hurricane Andrew, resurfaced during Katrina, 
intensified after Katrina and proven to be detrimental. 
Chapter V concludes this thesis by presenting findings directed to answer why 
DoD Title 10 and State civil authorities do not currently have a collaborative domestic 
disaster response relationship.  It offers policy recommendations based on those findings.  
The recommendations are focused on how to create relationship building mechanisms 
that will lead to disaster response collaboration and move away from the issue of control.  
This is done with hopes that those recommendations, if implemented, will be used to 
improve DoD Title 10 response before the next domestic catastrophic disaster. 
D. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A review of Federal, DoD, and State documents was conducted to establish DoDs 
Title 10 civil support role in domestic disasters and its connection to State civil 
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authorities.  Federal and DoD documents reviewed specifically defined DoDs Title 10 
role, limitations, and use.  They repetitively stated that DoD support was only to be used 
when State, and other response resources were overwhelmed.  Federal and DoD 
documents were clear as to when DoD civil support could be used and how to request it.  
However, even though States are the primary user of Title 10 support during a 
catastrophic disaster, there was no requirement to build a collaborative relationship 
between DoD and State civil authorities.11 An exploratory review of civilian emergency 
management literature and State and local emergency management plans indicated little 
to no mention of DoD Title 10 role in support of States during catastrophic disasters.  
When the military/Army was mentioned, these documents either referenced the Salvation 
Army or the Army Corps of Engineers or the National Guard giving little consideration to 
DoDs Title 10 role in catastrophic disaster response. 
1. DoD Support to Civil Authorities Defined 
A plethora of federal statutes, Homeland Security Presidential Directives, 
Department of Homeland Security documents, and Department of Defense documents, 
define DoDs current domestic disaster response role.  When the military assists domestic 
civil authorities, it is considered civil support (CS) and/or Defense Support of Civil 
Authorities (DSCA).  DSCA is defined in the National Response Plan (NRP) as, 
“…Department of Defense (DoD) support, including Federal military forces, DoD 
civilians and DOD contractor personnel, and DOD agencies and components, for 
domestic emergencies and for designated law enforcement and other activities.12 The 
NRPs 2004s definition of DSCA replaced the use of Military Assistance to Civil 
Authorities (MACA) which includes Military Support to Civil Authorities (MSCA) and 
Military Assistance to Law Enforcement (MACLEA). 
                                                 
11 Department of Homeland Security, National Response Plan, Washington DC, Department of 
Homeland Security, December 2004, 41, “Military Support to Civil Authorities,” DoD Directive 3025.1, 15 
January 1993, 12, “Homeland Operations,” AFDD 2-10, 21 March 2006, 25, “Air Force Emergency 
Management Program Planning and Operations,” AFI 10-2510, 24 January 2007, 39, 44. 
12 Department of Homeland Security, National Response Plan, 65. 
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2. Federal Statutes 
a. The Robert T. Stafford Act Disaster Relief and Emergency 
Assistance Act 
There are several federal statutes that shape DoDs role in domestic 
disaster response operations.  The Robert T. Stafford Act Disaster Relief and Emergency 
Assistance Act (Stafford Act) is the primary legal authority for the Federal government to 
use DoD and other federal agencies to assist in domestic disaster relief in the United 
States.  The Stafford Act authorizes the President to use Federal assets to supplement 
State and local efforts and capabilities to save lives, protect property, public health, and 
ensure safety thereby alleviating damage, loss, hardship, and suffering.13 Under the 
Stafford Act, once a major disaster is declared, the President can direct the DoD to 
support State and local response and recovery efforts by providing personnel, equipment, 
supplies, facilities, and managerial, technical, and advisory services.  In addition, the 
DoD can be used to perform emergency work on private and public land for up to 10 
days.  This is only if, “…the President determines that such work is essential for the 
preservation of life and property.”14 
However, before the President can approve Federal assistance, the 
Stafford Act requires that the President find that the, “…disaster is of such severity and 
magnitude that effective response is beyond the capabilities of the State,” and that the 
governor has taken appropriate response actions to include directing the execution of the 
State's emergency plan.15 It also requires the governor to provide information on the 
nature and amount of State resources that have been or will be committed to the disaster 
and certify that the State will comply with cost sharing requirements.  Once all these 
requirements have been met, Federal, to include DoD, resources are authorized.  All 
Federal resources must then be coordinated through a Federal Coordinating Officer 
                                                 
13 Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, as amended, and Related 
Authorities FEMA 592, June 2007 http://www.fema.gov/pdf/about/stafford_act.pdf accessed 20 September 
2007. 
14 Ibid., 40. 
15 Ibid., 26. 
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(FCO) who is authorized to work with a State Coordinating Officer (SCO).  The Stafford 
Act does not require any form of collaboration between DoD and State civil authority. 
b. The Posse Comitatus Act 
The Posse Comitatus Act (PCA) of 1878 is another statute that governs 
DoDs domestic response role.  It places limitations on the domestic use of Title 10 forces 
prohibiting them from performing certain functions during a disaster response.  It states 
that, “Whoever, except in cases and under circumstances expressly authorized by the 
Constitution or Act of Congress, willfully uses any part of the Army or the Air Force as a 
posse comitatus or otherwise to execute the laws shall be fined under this title or 
imprisoned not more than two years, or both.”16 Posse Comitatus is defined as the power 
of the county or its citizens summoned by the sheriff to assist the authorities in 
suppressing a riot, or executing any legal precept which is forcibly opposed.17  PCA was 
enacted in the years following the Civil War as a result of the increased use of the 
military in domestic affairs during the Reconstruction period.18 
PCA originally prohibited the Army from posse comitatus activities.  
However, in 1956 the Air Force was added and in 1981, Title 10 USC § 375 restricted the 
domestic use of the Navy and Marines.  It directed the Secretary of Defense to prescribe 
regulations to prohibit direct participation in search, seizure, arrest, or other similar 
activities by a member of the Army, Navy, Air Force, or Marine Corps unless their 
participation is otherwise authorized by law.19 PCA does not apply to military operations  
 
 
                                                 
16 Cornell University Law School, U.S. Code Collection, 
http://www4.law.cornell.edu/uscode/html/uscode18/usc_sec_18_00001385----000-.html accessed 27 
August 2007. 
17 Dictionary.com http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/Posse%20Comitatus%20 accessed on 28 
August 2007. 
18 “The Posse Comitatus Act: A Resource Guide,” LLRX.com, http://www.llrx.com/features/posse.htm 
accessed August 2007.  
19 Cornell University Law School, U.S. Code Collection, 
http://www4.law.cornell.edu/uscode/html/uscode10/usc_sec_10_00000375----000-.html accessed 28 
August 2007. 
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or to National Guard personnel when they are not under Title 10 status.  Some exceptions 
to PCA have been made by Congress.  Congress has authorized the DoD to use its 
resources for the following: 
   
• Assist with drug interdiction and other law enforcement functions (10 
U.S.C. §124 and 10 U.S.C. §§371-378 (excluding 375)) 
• Protect civil rights or property, or suppress insurrection (the Insurrection 
Statutes; 10 U.S.C. §§331-334) 
• Assist the U.S. Secret Service (18 U.S.C. §3056 Notes) 
• Protect nuclear materials and assist with solving crimes involving nuclear 
materials (18 U.S.C. §831) 
• Assist with some terrorist incidents involving weapons of mass destruction 
(10 U.S.C. §382) 
• Assist with the execution of quarantine and certain health laws (42 U.S.C. 
§§97-98) 20 
PCA ensures that law enforcement is left to the States per Constitutional 
Amendment 10 that states, “The powers not delegated to the United States by the 
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or 
to the people.”21 It imposes specific restrictions on Title 10 forces that serve as constant 
reminders to States that DoD Title 10 forces were once used by the Federal government 
to usurp State rights.  PCA adds a legislative barrier between Title 10 forces and the 
States.  It causes States to be weary of DoD involvement in disaster response and DoD to 
take pause before taking action and/or committing resources. 
                                                 
20 “Homeland Defense: DOD Needs to Assess the Structure of U.S. Forces for Domestic Military 
Missions,” United States Government Accountability Office, July 11, 2003, 
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d03670.pdf accessed 28 August 2007, 12. 
21 “The United States Constitution,” The U.S. Constitution on Line, 
http://www.usconstitution.net/const.html#Am10 accessed 10 October 2007. 
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c. The John Warner National Defense Authorization Act 
The John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 
2007 (NDAA) 22 also governs the military’s Title 10 role in disaster response.  This Act 
changed the dynamics for which Title 10 military personnel can be used during a 
domestic disaster response.  It changed Title 10, United States Code Chapter 15 
previously known as the “Insurrection Act” to the Enforcement of the Laws to Restore 
Public Order.  Section 1076 of the 2007 NDAA authorized the president to: 
…employ the armed forces, including the National Guard in Federal 
service, to restore public order and enforce the laws of the United States 
when, as a result of a natural disaster, epidemic, or other serious public 
health emergency, terrorist attack or incident, or other condition in any 
State or possession of the United States, the President determines that--
domestic violence has occurred to such an extent that the constituted 
authorities of the State or possession are incapable of maintaining public 
order…23 
Section 333 of Title 10 previously authorized the President to use the 
militia or the armed forces, or both in suppressing insurrection, domestic violence, 
unlawful combination, or conspiracy in a State if public order could not be maintained by 
State authorities. 24  The changes have expanded the potential use of the armed forces in a 
disaster response situation to go beyond disaster relief and move them into a law 
enforcement role at the President’s discretion.  Previously, the President could only do so 
in cases of insurrection, domestic violence, conspiracy, and/or uprising.  This statute is 
seen as contentious by many States who view the change as a move by the Federal 
government as an attempt to usurp the rights of the Governor. 
                                                 
22“The John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007,” The Library of 
Congress, http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/F?c109:6:./temp/~c109sZ7AW9:e939907 accessed 27 Aug 
2007. 
23 The John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007, section 1076. 
24 Cornell University Law School, U.S. Code Collection, 
http://www4.law.cornell.edu/uscode/html/uscode10/usc_sec_10_00000333----000-.html accessed 27 
August 2007. 
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3. Federal Documents 
a. Homeland Security Presidential Directives (HSPD) 5, 8 
Along with Federal statutes, Homeland Security Presidential Directives 
(HSPD) 5, 8 and the National Response Plan (NRP) establish the DoDs domestic disaster 
response role.  HSPD-5, Management of Domestic Incidents, directs the Secretary of 
Defense to, “…provide military support to civil authorities for domestic incidents as 
directed by the President or when consistent with military readiness and appropriate 
under the circumstances and the law.”25 It also states that the Secretary of Defense will 
retain command of military forces during civil support operations.  In addition, HSPD-5 
directs the DoD to use the National Incident Management System in their domestic 
incident management and emergency response, recovery, and mitigation activities and 
when providing civil support to State and local authorities.26 Whereas, HSPD-8, National 
Preparedness simply directs the DoD to provide the Secretary of Homeland Security 
information that describes the organizations and functions within DoD that could provide 
support to civil authorities during a domestic “crisis”.27 
b. National Response Plan 
The NRP restates and expands on DoDs domestic disaster response role as 
stated in HSPD-5 and 8.  It states that DoD has significant resources that may be 
available to support the Federal response to a domestic disaster, that DoD will assist 
when directed by the President, or when appropriate under the law, and that DoD will be 
commanded by the Secretary of Defense during civil support operations.28 It also states 
                                                 
25 The White House, Homeland Security Presidential Directive/HSPD-5, Washington DC, The White 
House, February 2006 http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/02/20030228-9.html accessed 10 
April 2007. 
26 Ibid., 1. 
27 The White House, Homeland Security Presidential Directive/HSPD-8, Washington DC, The White 
House, February 2006 http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/12/20031217-6.html accessed 28 
August 2007. 
28 Department of Homeland Security, National Response Plan, Washington DC, Department of 
Homeland Security, December 2004, 10. 
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that DOD will provide civil support when requests for response come from a lead or 
primary federal agency.  Once the lead or primary agency is placed in charge of disaster 
operations, DoD is placed in a supporting role.  It will fill requests for assistance when 
tasked by each primary federal agency.  DoD can not directly coordinate support with 
State civil authorities regardless of the size and scope of the disaster.  They must go 
through other Federal agencies.  The same applies for State civil authorities when 
requesting DoD assistance.  They must coordinate through a Federal agency in order to 
request DoD Title 10 assistance.  The only exception is Emergency Support Function 
(ESF) #3, Public Works and Engineering, where the Army Corps of Engineers is the 
primary agency with DoD showing as a coordinating not a support agency.29  
The NRP makes clear, DoD civil support is normally to be provided only 
when local, State, and Federal resources are overwhelmed  It does not interfere with DoD 
operations, and on a reimbursable basis as authorized by law.30 It also states that DoD is 
a support agency on all ESF and will only provide assistance to States upon approval 
from the Secretary of Defense.31 Finally, the NRP emphasizes that a relationship needs to 
exist between DHS/FEMA and DoD and not State civil authorities who will receive 
direct DoD assistance during a catastrophic disaster. 
4. DoD Documents 
a Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil support and 2006 
Quadrennial Defense Review 
Within DoD there are many documents that have shaped its disaster 
response role.  In 2005, DoD released its Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil 
support.  It was built upon several assumptions.  One assumption indicated that the DoD 
anticipated that the President would direct them to provide “substantial” support to civil 
authorities during major catastrophic events.  DoD planned to do this through a carefully 
                                                 
29 Department of Homeland Security, National Response Plan, p. ESF-v. 
30 Ibid., 42. 
31 Ibid., ESF-iv. 
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planned, practiced, and integrated national response.32 However, in almost stark 
opposition, DoDs 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) Report stated that DoD 
wanted other agencies and state and local governments to build the capacity to respond to 
domestic incidents so that they could perform their assigned responsibilities.  This would 
allow for minimal reliance on military support to civil authorities as opposed to that 
which was needed during Hurricane Katrina.33 
b DoDD 3025.15, Military Assistance to Civil Authorities 
DoDs policies and responsibilities for providing defense support to civil 
authorities are contained within three primary DoD directives (DoDD).  They include: 
DoDD 3025.15, Military Assistance to Civil Authorities, DoDD 3025.12, Military 
Assistance for Civil Disturbances (MACDIS), and DoDD 3025.1, Military Support to 
Civil Authorities.  DoDD 3025.15 governs all DoD military assistance to civil authorities.  
It mandates that all requests for assistance from civil authorities must be evaluated and 
approved using six criteria: 
• Legality 
• Lethality 
• Risk to DoD Forces 
• Cost 
• Appropriateness 
• Impact to DoD Readiness 
The criteria are designed to ensure DoDs readiness is not compromised and that their 
response is conducted in accordance with established laws.  The need of the requester is 
taken into consideration, but is not a determinant as to whether DoD Title 10 assistance 
will be rendered. 
                                                 
32 Department of Defense, Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support, Washington DC, 
Department of Defense, June 2005 http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jun2005/d20050630homeland.pdf 
accessed 24 October 2007, 9. 
33 Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report, Washington, DC, Department of 
Defense, February 6, 2006 http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/policy/dod/qdr-2006-report.pdf 
accessed 6 November 2007, 25. 
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The Secretary of Defense is the approval authority for all DoD civil 
support requests with the exception of those that are in direct response to natural or man-
made disasters.  In that event, the Secretary of the Army would be the approval 
authority.34 In addition, responding through written formal requests, DoDD 3025.15 
authorizes the DoD component or military commanders to provide civil support during 
imminently serious conditions.  It is referred to as immediate response authority.  This 
authority allows a commander to respond to support requests from civil authorities if it 
will save lives, prevent human suffering, or mitigate property damage.  Civil authorities 
can verbally request the support, but must follow it with a written request.  Upon 
exercising immediate response authority, the commander must report the request and the 
nature of the response to the appropriate military authority.35 
c. DoDD 3025.12, Military Assistance for Civil Disturbances 
DoDD 3025.12, Military Assistance for Civil Disturbances outlines DoDs 
policy and responsibilities when assisting Federal, State, and local governments and their 
law enforcement agencies during civil disturbances, including terrorist incidents.36 The 
directive states that any MACDIS requests by State or Federal civil law enforcement will 
come through the Attorney General to the Secretary of Defense.  In addition, civilian 
authority will maintain primacy during military support to law enforcement operations.37 
It also directs that the military not be used for MACDIS without Presidential 
authorization unless under emergency circumstances.  Emergency circumstances are 
considered, “When the use of Military Forces is necessary to prevent loss of life or 
wanton destruction of property, or to restore governmental functioning and public 
order.”38 This “emergency authority” should only be exercised if civil authorities can not 
control the situation and prior approval from the President can not be obtained.39 Finally, 
                                                 
34 “Military Assistance to Civil Authorities,” DoD Directive 3025.15, 18 February 1997, 3. 
35 “Military Assistance to Civil Authorities,” 4. 
36 “Military Assistance to Civil Disturbances,” DoD Directive 3025.12, 4 February 1994, 1. 
37 Ibid., 3. 
38 Ibid., 4. 
39 Ibid., p 4. 
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it prohibits DoD from taking charge of any function of civil government unless under 
extreme emergency making sure to facilitate civil control at the earliest possible time.40 
d. DoDD 3025.1, Military Support to Civil Authorities 
DoDD 3025.1 delineates the policy and responsibilities governing DoDs 
response to major domestic disasters and emergencies, although it was published on 
January 15, 1993.41 The directive states that DoD support to civil authorities under the 
above circumstances are subject to the priorities of the President and the Secretary of 
Defense contingent on the availability of resources.42 In addition, civil resources must 
also first be utilized and FEMA, or the lead federal agency, must determine if the 
capabilities of civil authorities are overwhelmed, before civil support is provided.43 
DoDD 3025.1 also states that support to civil authorities is ordinarily provided on a 
reimbursable base.  However, it clearly states that the lack of reimbursement will not 
preclude DoD from providing support.  This includes requests for assistance through 
normal DoD channels or through the immediate response authority discussed earlier. 
The directive also includes the authority for the DoD Executive Agent 
(Secretary of the Army) to respond to any non-declared domestic major disaster or 
emergency in the event of an attack or other emergency circumstances.44 Finally, DoD 
3025.1 establishes links between the DoD and non-State civil authorities in order to 
facilitate their domestic disaster response role.  It directs planning and response ties with 
the Red Cross and FEMA.45 It also assigns Reservists to FEMA and other government 
offices for civil support liaison and planning purposes.  What DoDD 3025.1 does not do  
 
 
                                                 
40 “Military Assistance to Civil Disturbances,” DoD Directive 3025.12, 4 February 1994, 5. 
41 “Military Support to Civil Authorities,”, 2. 
42 Ibid., 5. 
43 Ibid., 6. 
44 Ibid., 10. 
45 Ibid., 12. 
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is establish direct ties with State civil authorities apart from advocating that local military 
installations make contacts with State and local officials for planning and response 
purposes. 
5. Emergency Management Literature 
An exploratory review of civilian emergency management literature and 
State/local emergency management plans indicated little to no mention of DoD Title 10 
role in support of States during disasters.  Of the emergency management “how to” and 
planning texts reviewed, most made no mention of military disaster assistance to State or 
local authorities.46 Those that did raise the use of the military during disaster response 
had varying approaches.  One text focused on the military’s “martial law” role, 
emphasizing how, even during Hurricane Katrina, martial law was never declared 
because “Americans are extremely hesitant to turn over total control to government 
officials, police, and the military.”47 Another text that dealt with transportation disaster 
response cautioned against using the military during a disaster response.  The author 
sighted a number of concerns when using “a standing army” for disaster response  A 
standing Army is heavily administrative during non conflict situations and will have 
minimal operational manpower.  Many military supplies are inappropriate for civilian 
populations such as not having special dietary foods.  Finally, the author warned putting 
the army in control is a mistake, “martial law has been prematurely declared in numerous 
incidents.  Its effects can be more negative than positive.”48 DoD Title 10 disaster 
response and how it was connected to State civil authorities was not mentioned in any of 
the texts. 
                                                 
46 Paul A. Erickson, Emergency Response Planning for Corporate and Municipal Managers. 
Burlington, MA: Elsevier Butterworth-Heinemann, 2006., Ronald W. Perry, and Michael K. Lindell, 
Emergency Planning. Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 2007., Anna J. Schwab, Katherine, 
Eschelbach, and David J. Brower, Hazard Mitigation and Preparedness: Building Resilient Communities. 
Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 2007., William H Stringfield, Emergency Management and 
Planning. Rockville, MA: Government Institutes, 2000. 
47 David A. McEntire. Disaster Response and Recovery: Strategies and Tactics and Resilience. 
Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 2007, 76. 
48 Jay Levinson and Hayim Granot, Transportation Disaster Response Handbook. San Diego, CA: 
Academic Press, 2002, 62. 
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6. State and Local Emergency Management Plans 
To follow suit with most “how to” emergency management and planning texts, a 
an exploratory review of State and local emergency management plans also made sparse 
mention of Title 10 military response during a disaster.  New Mexico’s all-hazard plan 
focused on utilizing local military installation resources and discussed DoDs involvement 
in establishing a National Defense Area.  It does not include how to integrate DoD Title 
10 forces into State response if required.49 Alabama’s plan did provide the definition of 
DSCA.  However, it went no further than to state DoD may provide additional logistical 
support and that the Alabama National Guard is responsible to coordinate that support. 50 
Finally, Colorado’s plan made no differentiation between DoD and Federal assistance.  It 
categorized all support above State level as Federal assistance.51 
The results were much the same for city and county disaster plans.  Provisions for 
DoD response and support were also absent.  Of nine city and county emergency 
management plans (taken from seven different states) only one plan made mention of 
military operations in support of local authorities with regard to responding during a 
disaster. 52 The exception was Seattle, Washington’s Disaster Readiness and Response 
Plan (DRRP).  It contained an entire military support annex that explained how to request 
military support during a disaster, and what authority governs it.  Seattle’s DRRP even 
                                                 
49 “New Mexico All-Hazard Emergency Operations Plan,” State of New Mexico, Department of 
Public Safety, Jun 1, 2004, https://www.llis.dhs.gov/docdetails/details.do?contentID=16350 accessed 7 
August 2007. 
50 “Alabama Emergency Operations Plan,” Alabama Emergency Management Agency, April 20, 2006 
https://www.llis.dhs.gov/docdetails/details.do?contentID=16164 accessed 7 August 2007. 
51 “State of Colorado Emergency Operations Plan,” State of Colorado, Division of Emergency 
Management, May 1, 2006 https://www.llis.dhs.gov/docdetails/details.do?contentID=21512 accessed 7 
August 2007. 
52 Department of Homeland Security. Boulder, Colorado Emergency Operations Plan.  Washington 
D.C.: Department of Homeland Security. January 2006, and City of Albuquerque All-Hazards Emergency 
Operations Plan. December 2005,City of Austin Emergency Operations Plan, Master Plan. February 2002, 
Empire County Comprehensive Emergency Management Plan. January 2004, Pahrump, Nevada 
Comprehensive Emergency Management Plan. June 2005, City and County of San Francisco Emergency 
Operations Plan. January 2005, Ashtabula County All Natural Hazards Mitigation Plan. January 2006, Los 
Angeles County Operational Area Emergency Response Plan: Tsunami Annex. March 2006, City of 
Portland, Oregon Basic Emergency Operations Plan. September 2006, Horry County, South Carolina 
Emergency Management Plan. June 2006 https://www.llis.dhs.gov/member/secure/detail.cfm accessed 10 
April 2007. 
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delineated responsibilities for emergency management authorities and local military 
installation commanders with regards to military support during disasters.53 However, as 
indicated above, Seattle’s incorporation of military support during disasters in their 
emergency management plan was the exception, not the norm. 
                                                 
53 Department of Homeland Security. Seattle Disaster Readiness and Response Plan. Washington DC: 
Department of Homeland Security, December 2002, 
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II. INCREASED POTENTIAL FOR DOD TITLE 10 DISASTER 
RESPONSE 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Although Federal and DoD documents clearly established DoDs Title 10 civil 
support role in domestic disasters, they did not emphasize the need for DoD Title 10 
forces and State civil authorities to build a collaborative response relationship.  This is 
despite a 2006 United States Government Accountability Office report finding that there 
was, “…a lack of understanding within the military and among federal, state, and local 
responders as to the types of assistance and capabilities that DOD might provide in the 
event of a catastrophe…some of the military’s available assets were never requested or 
proactively deployed.”54  And despite a 2006 Congressional investigation into the 
preparation and response of Hurricane Katrina indicating that the DoD is relying on State 
civil authorities in order to make the most efficient and effective use of military support.  
The report stated: 
As robust as the military capability is, there are limitations, many of which 
are highlighted in the specific findings below. The most important limit to 
the military’s ability to manage domestic disaster response is the nation’s 
traditional reliance on local control to handle incident response. The 
federal government, with the Department of Defense (DOD) serving as 
part of the federal response team, takes its directions from state and local 
leaders. Since that is our nation’s tradition, DOD does not plan to be the 
lead agency in any disaster situation and expects to assist as local 
authorities request and direct. Furthermore, DOD lacks the detailed 
knowledge of local conditions essential to effective relief operations.55 
This chapter emphasizes the criticality of building a collaborative relationship 
between DoD Title 10 forces and State civil authorities so that DoD response can be 
                                                 
54 United States Government Accountability Office, Catastrophic Disasters: Enhanced Leadership, 
Capabilities, and Accountability Controls Will Improve the Effectiveness of the Nation’s Preparedness, 
Response, and Recovery System, Washington DC: United States Government Accountability Office, 
September 2006, 27. 
55 House of Representatives, A Failure of Initiative: Final Report of the Select Bipartisan Committee 
to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina, 201. 
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improved for the next catastrophic disaster.  This is based on research that illustrates the 
potential for greater DoD Title 10 involvement in domestic disaster response due to the 
ever increasing risk of future domestic catastrophes.  The National Planning Scenarios 
(NPS), the 2007 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE), and data concerning natural 
disasters all indicate that there is as increased risk of such events.  In part, this is due to 
the elevated threat of asymmetric terrorist attacks on the United States and the ever 
present risk of manmade and natural disasters.  As with past catastrophic disasters, these 
events are certain to overwhelm State and local response resources punctuating the need 
for DoD and State civil authorities to build a collaborative relationship aimed at 
improving DoD response. 
B. NATIONAL PLANNING SCENARIOS SET THE STAGE 
September 11th, 2001 proved to the United States that its shores were not 
impenetrable to those who wanted to inflict catastrophic destruction upon its people.  
Hurricane Katrina demonstrated that even a great superpower could be caught unprepared 
to respond to nature’s awesome fury.  Those two catastrophic events induced a sense of 
vulnerability in the United States so much so that the occurrence of another catastrophic 
event and the ability to effectively respond to it are of major concern.  In 2005, the 
Homeland Security Scenarios Working Group created a document called the NPS.  It 
enumerates fifteen potential terrorist attacks and natural disasters that the United States 
may be faced with in the near future.  The document is designed to be used as a response 
capability building and planning aid for Federal, State, and local officials.  The fifteen 
scenarios range from the detonation of a 10-kiloton improvised nuclear device, an 
outbreak of Foot and Mouth disease, to a major hurricane. They are intended to assist 
officials in identifying the scope, magnitude, and complexity of a potential disaster so 
recurring capability response requirements can be built and exercised.56 Each scenario is 
outlined as follows: 
 
                                                 
56 “National Planning Scenarios,” Department of Homeland Security, March 2006 
https://www.llis.dhs.gov/member/secure/getfile.cfm?id=13712 accessed 4 October 2007, ii. 
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• Scenario Overview 
• General Description 
• Detailed Attack Scenario 
• Planning Considerations 
• Geographical Considerations/Description 
• Timeline/Event Dynamics 
• Meteorological Conditions (where applicable) 
• Assumptions 
• Mission Areas Activated 
• Implications 
• Secondary Hazards/Events 
• Fatalities/Injuries 
• Property Damage 
• Service Disruption 
• Economic Impact 
• Long-Term Health Issues57 
The first scenario involves the detonation of a 10-kiloton improvised nuclear 
device in a large metropolitan area.  This scenario estimates hundreds of thousands dead, 
100,000 in need of decontamination, 250,000 required to shelter in place, and one million 
people having to self-evacuate.  The contaminated area spans 3,000 square miles.  The 
economic impact is in the hundreds of billions of dollars and the recovery timeline is 
estimated to take years.58 With an event of this magnitude immediate and direct DoD 
Title 10 involvement would be unavoidable.  However, in the section of the NPS entitled 
Mission Areas Activated it subtly states, “After the detonation, officers will provide 
reconnaissance, protection, and deterrence measures at the boundaries of the site.  
Perimeters will need to be established…It is likely that the National Guard and perhaps 
the military will be involved directly in these areas.  A declaration of martial law may be 
                                                 
57 “National Planning Scenarios,” Department of Homeland Security, iii-IV. 
58 Ibid., 1-1. 
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considered.”59 This should indicate to State civil authorities that DoD Title 10 response 
to their States will occur and that collaborative relationships must be built so that DoD 
response will arrive when needed. 
Out of the remaining NPS the likelihood of immediate DoD Title 10 involvement 
is almost certain in 9 of the 14 scenarios.  This is based on size and scope of the disasters 
and/or due to the unique capabilities of DoD in responding to large natural, chemical, and 
biological event.  For example, the size and scope of the biological disease outbreak and 
chemical attack via blister agent scenarios in the NPS would quickly overwhelm local 
and state authorities requiring immediate DoD assistance.  Even the major hurricane 
scenario would require the military’s immediate involvement considering it is similar in 
magnitude to Hurricane Katrina.  However, despite the high probability that the DoD 
would immediately respond to two-thirds of the proposed scenarios, the only other 
mention in the NPS of the use of military is in the Foot and Mouth Disease scenario.  It 
simply mentions that, “The States would be expected to emphasize the need for 
containment and would also require Federal funding to cover costs, Federal personnel to 
support State efforts, and the use and availability of the National Guard.”60 The NPS is 
careful not to incorporate the use of DoD Title 10 involvement throughout the document 
despite 10 of the 15 scenarios making it evident that DoD Title 10 response will most 
likely occur in order to contain the disaster and assist in treating and saving the lives of 
citizens.  Although the requirement for DoD involvement is not explicitly expressed in 
the NPS, the scenarios clearly indicate DoD Title 10 will immediately need to respond. 
C. INCREASED RISK OF A CATASTROPHIC TERRORIST ATTACK 
The increased potential for a catastrophic attack perpetrated by terrorists as 
spelled out in the NPS was made evident in the summer of 2007.  In the July 2007 NIE 
entitled, The Terrorist Threat to the US Homeland it made clear that the terrorist threat to 
the United States will be persistent and evolving over the next three years.  The main 
threat to the United States continues to be Al-Qa’ida.  The report stated that Al-Qa’ida, 
                                                 
59 I“National Planning Scenarios,” Department of Homeland Security, .1-4. 
60 “National Planning Scenarios,” Department of Homeland Security, 14-4. 
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“continues to plan high-impact plots, while pushing others in extremist Sunni 
communities to mimic its efforts and to supplement its capabilities.”61 They will focus 
their efforts on striking the heart of the United States with the intent to cause mass 
casualties leading in economic disruption and the spreading of fear.   Most disturbingly, 
the NIE stated: 
We assess that al-Qa’ida will continue to try to acquire and employ 
chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear material in attacks and would 
not hesitate to use them if it develops what it deems is sufficient 
capability.62 
The NIE highlights the possibility that many of the scenarios in the NPS may be 
more realistic then some want to believe.  As for DoD and State civil authorities it should 
highlight that a large Title 10 response in the near future is inevitable and relationships 
must be built. 
D. INCREASED RISK OF A CATASTROPHIC NATURAL DISASTER 
In addition to the increased risk of a terrorist group triggering a catastrophic 
disaster in the US, the probability of a natural catastrophe causing significant damage 
beyond what States and local authorities may be able to handle has increased.  The 2006 
Annual Review of North American Natural Catastrophes indicated that 40 significant 
natural catastrophes occurred in the United States between 1997 and 2006. 63 That 
number has increased from 35 the decade before and from only 13 catastrophic disasters 
in the 1980s.64 The Review defined a significant natural catastrophe as one that caused at 
least 50 deaths and had an estimated economic loss of $1 billion per 2006 dollars.  The 
catastrophes included earthquakes, volcanic eruptions, floods, tropical cyclones, 
thunderstorm events (tornadoes/hailstorms), winter storms, and other events (e.g., wild-
                                                 
61 “National Intelligence Estimate: The Terrorist Threat to the US Homeland,” National Intelligence 
Council, July 2007 https://www.llis.dhs.gov/member/secure/getfile.cfm?id=13712 accessed 4 October 
2007, 6. 
62 Ibid., 6. 
63 “Annual Review of North American Natural Catastrophes,” Munich Reinsurance America Group, 
July 2007 http://www.climateandinsurance.org/news/MunichCATReview.pdf accessed 24 Aug 2007. 
64 Ibid., 11. 
 26
land fires) that occurred in the United States, Puerto Rico, and the United States Virgin 
Islands.65 That isn’t to say that all 40 significant catastrophes required DoD assistance.  
However, if the growing population centers and commercially developed areas near 
coastlines or other disaster prone areas are considered, then the likelihood of another 
DoD response to a catastrophic natural disaster is inevitable and must be accounted for. 
On the 30th year anniversary of Hurricane Camille, a report remembering the 
lessons learned and lessons lost predicted what could eerily be said to be Hurricane 
Andrew three years later and Hurricane Katrina 16 years later.  It states: 
For many, Camille is a distant memory, a historical footnote from a time 
long gone. But Camille is also a harbinger of disasters to come. Another 
storm of Camille's intensity will strike the United States, the only question 
is when. When this future storm strikes, it will make landfall over 
conditions drastically different from those in 1969. The hurricane-prone 
regions of the United States have developed dramatically as people have 
moved to the coast and the nation's wealth has grown. Estimates of 
potential losses from a single hurricane approach $100 billion.66 
Sadly, Hurricane Andrew left 20 people dead67 and cost 48.4 billion in 2005 
dollars.68  Hurricane Katrina caused 1,557 deaths and cost an estimated 150 billion 
dollars.69 Both Andrew and Katrina required an immediate DoD response, yet during 
both disasters the assistance did not arrive during the first few critical days.  Although 
DoD Title 10 disaster response proved invaluable, the lack of a relationship between DoD 
and State civil authorities contributed to a slow initial response to both catastrophes. 
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III. FROM IMMEDIATE RESPONSE TO AMBIGUITY 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Fortunately, in years past the Federal military’s relationship with State civil 
authorities did not impede their initial domestic disaster response.  Although not perfect, 
historical military disaster response was swift, immediate, and welcomed by State and 
local civil authorities.  This chapter is divided into four historical phases that trace the 
Federal military’s role in domestic disaster response and their changing relationship with 
civil authorities.  It analyzes the military’s involvement to a variety of past disasters and 
examines how legislative and doctrinal changes changed their relationship.  The first 
phase examines the Federal military’s role from 1871 to 1926.  It details the military role 
as the nation’s primary response agency and how it worked hand in hand with civil 
authorities during disasters.  The second phase examines the military’s role from 1927 to 
1949.  It describes how the military’s slowly receded as the Nation’s primary disaster 
response agency.  The third phase spans from 1950 to 1970 and focuses on the 
institutional divide that weakened the relationship between DoD and State civil 
authorities.  Finally, phase four analyzes how DoD divested itself from domestic disaster 
response eliminating the need to maintain a relationship with State civil authorities from 
1971 until 1992.  These phases shed insight on the changing domestic response role of 
the Federal military.  They examine how and why the relationship between the military 
and State civil authorities slowly weakened.  They also explain why the relationship 
eventually transformed from a collaborative one during the 1800s and early 1900s to one 
based on ambiguity by 1992 contributing to DoDs eventual slow response to Hurricane 
Andrew. 
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B. THE EARLY YEARS (1871-1926) 
1. The Chicago Fire 
Since the 1870s, the decade when Congress began to grant disaster relief, 
appropriations on a more commonplace basis; the military/Army was thrust into the role 
of domestic disaster response.  During those years, the Army by virtue of its geographic 
dispersion, presence, and stockpiles of rations was better equipped than any other federal 
agency to render rapid disaster assistance.70 The Army was imbedded into the local 
communities making them more accessible in the event of a state or local catastrophe.  
Between 1868 and 1898 the Army participated in 17 separate disaster relief efforts, to 
include the catastrophic Chicago fire of 1871.71 
During the Chicago Fire of 1871, the military acted promptly in response to the 
catastrophic conflagration that engulfed the entire city.  On October 9, 1871 Lieutenant 
General P.H. Sheridan, commander of the Army's Division of the Missouri informed 
William W. Belknap, the Secretary of War, that the Chicago fire had destroyed most of 
the city and left some 100,000 people homeless.  The Secretary of War immediately 
ordered Army personnel from depots at St. Louis, Jeffersonville, and elsewhere to 
“…liberally and promptly” send clothing, tools, and provisions to Chicago.72 The Army 
worked directly with local authorities in order to fill both humanitarian and security 
needs.  They sent over 1000 troops to Chicago, at the request of the Mayor, to maintain 
law and order for three weeks.  This occurred only after the Chicago’s Board of Trade 
requested General Sheridan to have troops help patrol the city.73 Chicago’s Mayor’s 
official proclamation read: 
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The preservation of the good order and peace of the city is hereby 
entrusted to Lieut. General P.H. Sheridan, U.S. Army.  The Police will act 
in conjunction with the Lieut. General in the preservation of the peace and 
quiet of the city, and the Superintendent of the Police will consult with 
him to that end.  The intent being to preserve the peace of the city without 
interfering with the functions of the city government. 
Given under my seal this October 11, A.D. 1871. 
R.B. MASON, Mayor74 
The military’s response and relief efforts during the Chicago fire were immediate 
and effective.  So much so that Mayor Mason wrote General Sheridan on October 22nd 
thanking the military for their assistance.  Mayor Mason wrote, “Permit me to tender you 
the thanks of the city of Chicago and its whole people for the very efficient aid which you 
have rendered, in protecting the lives and property of the citizens, and in the preservation 
of the general peace and good order of the community.”75 For civil authorities, the 
response to the Chicago fire demonstrated a willingness to enthusiastically welcome 
military assistance.  For the military, it demonstrated their willingness to render 
assistance immediately and without hesitation to the residents of Chicago.  Much of this 
collaboration was based on the Nation’s reliance on the military’s ability to fill a lead 
responder role and the relationship they had with State and local civil authorities. 
2. The Galveston Hurricane 
Some 30 years later, another catastrophic disaster befell the United States and 
once again the military responded immediately.  They worked directly with State and 
local authorities as they performed response and relief missions to aid the city of 
Galveston, Texas.  On September 8, 1900 Galveston was struck by one of the worse 
natural catastrophes in United States history.  The Galveston Hurricane claimed an 
estimated 6,000-8,000 lives and destroyed over 3,600 buildings.  The destruction and 
death toll was unimaginable considering that Galveston’s population was 37,000 in 
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1900.76  Galveston lost more than 21% of its population to the hurricane.  In comparison, 
Hurricane Katrina would have had to cause over 95,000 deaths in New Orleans alone to 
have equaled the death toll experienced in Galveston.77 Paul Lester quotes a leading 
journal of the time as describing the scene in Galveston: 
The cry for help which comes from the stricken city of Galveston and the 
surrounding country is a moving appeal which should receive the readiest 
and most generous response.  The extent of the disaster which has 
overtaken the city and the coast country of Texas has not been overdrawn, 
it seems, in the reports from the scene, and it would be impossible to 
exaggerate the horror of the catastrophe and the distress and the suffering 
that followed in its wake.78 
In response to the Galveston Hurricane and at the request of Governor J.D. Sayers 
of Texas, President McKinley immediately ordered troops and supplies sent to Texas.79 
Without pause, the War Department immediately dispatched 55,000 rations, 1,500 tents, 
and other supplies to Galveston.  The military’s actions were typified in the following 
report. “Fortunately, the Government has stepped in and, through the War Department, is 
lending prompt and effective aid.  Tents and rations are being rushed to Galveston with 
all possible speed…”80 In addition to the Army’s response, the Navy Department sent 
ships to assist in disaster efforts ordering them to,“…co-operate with the municipal and 
state authorities in whatever service should be required.”81 The War and Navy 
Departments ensured that military personnel worked with State and local authorities to 
provide the most effective support to those in need.  One author described the support the 
military provided as strong due to, “…the efforts of numerous generals and their troops 
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stretching from Washington to Galveston.”82  Governor Sayers sent a telegram thanking 
President McKinley for allowing the War Department to assist in relief efforts.  He 
stated, “Your action will be greatly appreciated and gratefully remembered by the people 
of Texas.”83 
3. The San Francisco Earthquake 
Six years later, the military once again played an instrumental role in response to 
a catastrophic disaster.  This time it was in response to the 1906 San Francisco 
Earthquake.  The destruction was so great that every service of the Armed Forces worked 
along side civil authorities during the City’s response and recovery operations.84 The 
military’s response began on April 18, 1906 when Brigadier General Fredrick Funston 
acting Commander of the Army’s Pacific Division made a command decision, moments 
after he stepped out of his San Francisco home and witnessed the damage caused by the 
quake.  Funston took it upon himself to “save the city” and sent regular Army troops into 
San Francisco from Fort Mason without authorization from civil authorities.85 Shortly 
after his decision, Funston received approval for his actions from San Francisco’s Mayor, 
Eugene Schmitz.  From that point on, Funston and the Mayor worked in a collaborative 
manor to best utilize military resources. 
The military’s initial response thrust focus on maintaining law and order by 
preventing looting and assisting in fighting fires throughout the city.  Federal troops were 
sent into the streets with orders from San Francisco’s Mayor, “…to KILL any and all 
persons found engaged in Looting or in the Commission of Any Other Crime.”86 In 
addition to law and order, Army artillery corpsman assisted the city’s firefighters by 
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setting explosives aimed at destroying buildings for the purpose of creating firebreaks.87 
The Navy sent ships filled with Sailors and Marines.  From ships, the military pumped 
seawater into the city as they worked side by side with firefighters.  Together they 
struggled valiantly in an effort to save San Francisco’s waterfront.  All toll, an estimated 
2000 federal troops flooded into San Francisco to assist in the disaster response effort.88 
In addition to the disaster response effort, the military heavily contributed to San 
Francisco’s relief effort.  The Presidio of San Francisco was turned into a refugee camp.  
Garrison cookhouses were opened.  Thousands of tents and blankets were distributed and 
700,000 rations sent for from the Army’s Portland and Seattle commissaries to feed 
victims of the earthquake.89 On April 27th the Army was placed in charge of logistics.  
The War Department ordered them to control and distribute relief supplies to some 
350,000 San Franciscans.  For three months, the Army remained in San Francisco to fill a 
badly needed disaster relief role.  They remained in the City until the end of June 1906 
working diligently with civil authorities.90 
Unfortunately, the military’s involvement in response to the San Francisco 
Earthquake has been criticized by some as less than heroic.  Some soldiers were accused 
of participating in looting, not preventing it.  They were accused with overzealously 
carrying out their “shoot looters on sight” orders.  Most of all they were criticized by 
some for entering San Francisco without an invitation by civil authorities.  Despite 
criticisms, the military’s response and relief role during San Francisco’s catastrophic 
earthquake could not be underestimated.  Nor could the way military leadership worked 
directly with the civil authorities to effectively support the City’s needs.  Although 
controversial, Funston’s initiative to respond with Federal troops prior to informing San 
Francisco’s Mayor signaled the solid relationship military officials had with the City’s 
civil authorities.  The Mayor could have easily felt threatened by Funston’s unilateral 
actions, yet he did not.  Instead he gave the military unprecedented response authority 
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placing trust and confidence in their intentions and capabilities.  This demonstrated how 
the pre-existing relationship between the military and civil authorities positively impacted 
the response to the San Francisco Earthquake. 
4. Mississippi River Flooding 
The criticisms the military received from their 1906 response to the San Francisco 
Earthquake did little to prevent their use in future catastrophes.  The Federal government 
as well as State and local authorities continued to rely on the Department of War as an 
invaluable disaster response and relief agency.  In 1912, the Mississippi River banks 
flooded 5 to 60 miles inland from its banks stretching a distance of nearly 800 miles.91 
This flooding was so severe that it necessitated a national response.  President William 
Howard Taft directed the only agency capable of bringing immediate and extensive 
resources to the victims of the flood to respond.  He instructed Secretary of War, Henry 
Stimson to send Army resources.  Stimson appointed Major James E. Normoyle of the 
Quartermaster Corps to take charge of relief operations.  Major Normoyle took a local 
approach to the disaster response.  He placed Army officers in charge of specific 
geographic areas.  This allowed them to independently commit resources and manpower 
based off specific geographic needs.  His geographically dispersed units were left to 
conduct rescue and relief efforts.  They focused on setting up refugee camps and 
delivering food, clothing, and tents.  This was done in coordination with civil authorities 
and with little interference from other agencies.92 
C. CHANGING TIDES (1927-1949) 
1. The Great Mississippi Valley Flooding 
Up until 1927, when a catastrophic disaster occurred, the War Department 
immediately mobilized its resources and became the de facto driving force behind the 
Federal government’s responses to requests for disaster assistance from the States.  At the 
                                                 
91 Foster, 68. 
92 Ibid., 69. 
 34
same time, if the States needed disaster assistance, they did not hesitate to ask for military 
assistance.  When the States did ask, the military worked directly with State and local 
civil authorities.  It was a resource needer-resource provider relationship.  If the State and 
local authorities needed immediate aid after a catastrophic disaster, the military provided 
immediate response.  However, neither this relationship nor the military’s role as the lead 
domestic disaster response agency would last much longer.  The bureaucratic tides of 
change soon engulfed the Nation’s domestic disaster arena. 
2. A Recovery Czar Appointed 
In 1927 President Calvin Coolidge, in response to extensive flooding in the 
Mississippi Valley, added a layer of bureaucracy to the Federal government’s method of 
responding to catastrophic disasters.  He appointed of the Secretary of Commerce, 
Herbert Hoover, as the chairman of a government committee set up to assist the Red 
Cross in disaster relief.93 This occurred after several state governors requested Federal 
assistance based on the severity of flooding in the Mississippi Valley.94 The flooding 
encompassed over 26,000 square miles of land in seven states, destroying 41,487 
buildings, leaving some 246 people dead.95 
Appointing Hoover as head of catastrophic disaster relief was a shift in disaster 
response protocol.  In the past, as seen in the Chicago Fire, the Galveston Hurricane, and 
the San Francisco Earthquake; the War Department had been the main domestic 
catastrophic disaster response and relief agency tasked by the Federal government to 
work directly with State and local authorities.  The relationship changed when Hoover set 
up a committee to facilitate disaster relief operations.  His committee, along with the Red 
Cross, was charged with heading up disaster response and relief operations.  This placed 
the War Department in a supporting role responding to, not the States, but to another 
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Federal authority.  The War Department was now required to act only at the request of 
Hoover’s committee and not based on direct requests from the affected States.  As one 
author stated, Hoover’s plan: 
…provided supplies in bulk for local officials to distribute, and control as 
they pleased…But despite the basic similarity [to the Army’s system], at 
least one crucial change had occurred: a civilian official and the Red Cross 
directed relief operations, not the War Department and its corps area 
commanders.  Since Hoover wanted local forces-primarily the volunteers 
of the Red Cross and the sometime-soldiers of the National Guard-to 
render relief, the Army functioned as what amounted to a wholesaler of 
equipment…96 
Hoover’s planning and modified system of response not only changed the military’s 
response role, it also became an early introduction to what would later evolve into 
emergency management. 
3. The Military’s Newly Defined Disaster Role 
President Coolidge’s precedent setting appointment of Hoover as “Recovery 
Czar”97 during the 1927 floods forced the military to redefine their disaster response role.  
During the 1927 floods, the military was told to loan the Red Cross and other 
organizations equipment.  After the flood, the military was left with a “$13 million bill 
for the loss and depreciation on its equipment.”98 Most of this equipment was loaned to 
the Red Cross.  Due to the damage that had been done to its equipment and the lack of 
reimbursement from the 1927 floods, the Army began to recede from the domestic 
disaster relief role.  At one point, a War Department study conducted in 1932 stated the 
following as to the use of Army resources during disasters, “The time has arrived when 
the War Department must cease to be regarded as an eleemosynary institution and insist 
upon a strict observance of the law regarding the use of public property.”99 
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In the years following, the Army responded to several other disasters.  They 
expended many resources yet found reimbursements negligible.  On May 1938, in order 
to address the depletion of military resources and the impact responding to disasters was 
having on Army readiness, “The Army recognized the Red Cross as the nation's primary 
disaster relief agency, though its corps area commanders retained the prerogative of 
committing Army personnel and resources.  Once involved, however, the Army would 
abdicate a great deal of authority to the Red Cross…”  The Army even went so far as to 
revise their Army Regulation (AR) 500-60 and incorporate the support role of the Army 
and the role and responsibility of the Red Cross in the event of a domestic disaster.100 
The Army’s recognition of the Red Cross validated what the Red Cross’s 1900 and later 
1905 Congressional Charter had stated all along: 
That the purposes of this corporation are and shall be…to continue and 
carry on a system of national and international relief in time of peace and 
apply the same in mitigating the sufferings caused by pestilence, famine, 
fires, floods, and other great national calamities, and to devise and carry 
on measures for preventing the same.101 
That same year of 1938, Gaines Foster sites Major General George Van Horn 
Moseley, commander of the 4th Corps as stating, “…if financed…the Army should be 
called only in an "emergency so critical and so extensive that it taxes the regular civil 
institutions beyond their power." Even on such occasions the Army should remain only 
for as long as absolutely necessary.  As soon as possible, civilian authorities must take 
control.”102 Moseley’s statement was to become a foreshadowing of today’s military 
domestic disaster role as stated in the 2004 NRP.  The NRP states that military support 
“…is provided when local, State, and Federal resources are overwhelmed, provided that 
it does not interfere with the Department’s military readiness or operations.103 The 
appointment of a recovery czar, Moseley’s comments that the military be used as a  
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resource of last resort, and the dispute over reimbursement of military expenses began to 
corrode the solid response relationship the military once had held with State and local 
civil authorities. 
However, the effects on the domestic disaster relationship between the military 
and State civil authorities would not be apparent for years to come.  Throughout the 
1930s and 40s, the military continued to respond to domestic disasters due to the 
specialized resources and capabilities they possessed.  In 1938, they provided aid to New 
England following a hurricane.  Later in 1945 the Army Air Corps dropped bales of hay 
and feed to starving cattle during a prolonged blizzard in Colorado.104 In 1947, the Army 
sent a 47 vehicle convoy to Texas City, Texas after chemicals exploded as they were 
loaded on a ship.  The Army provided supplies, assisted in evacuations, set up field 
kitchens, and controlled traffic.  In addition, the newly created Air Force sent 39 air 
transport planes to bring in supplies and medical personnel.105 Two years later in 1949, 
over 6000 military and civilian personnel teamed up to aid Midwesterners blanketed by a 
series of blizzards.  In response, the Air Force and Army teamed up to execute 
“Operation Snowbound” The Air Force flew 1260 sorties air dropping badly needed feed 
and supplies.106 As the 1940s ended, the military continued to respond to domestic 
disasters and the Federal government looked towards institutionalizing federal disaster 
assistance. 
D. INSTITUTIONAL DIVIDE (1950-1970) 
1. Public Law 875 
On September 30, 1950 Congress passed Public Law 875 better know as The 
Disaster Relief Act of 1950.  This Act unintentionally continued to weaken the 
relationship between DoD Title 10 and State civil authorities by creating an institutional 
divide.  Public Law 875’s intent was: 
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…to provide an orderly and continuing means of assistance by the Federal 
Government to the States and local governments in carrying out their 
responsibilities to alleviate suffering and damage resulting from major 
disasters, to repair essential public facilities in major disasters, and to 
foster the development of such State and local organizations and plans to 
cope with major disasters as may be necessary.107 
2. Federal Institutionalization of Disaster Response 
Public Law 875 for the first time institutionalized the Federal government’s role 
in domestic disaster relief.  It made clear that all Federal agencies, to include the DoD, 
were authorized to provide disaster assistance to State and local authorities.  It also 
identified the need for State and locals to develop organizations and plans in order to 
cope with major disasters.  Finally, it gave the President the Power to designate an 
agency of his choosing to carry out the provisions of Public Law 875.108 By authorizing 
all Federal agencies to provide disaster assistance, it placed responsibility on other non-
military agencies to consider their part if called upon. 
Since Public Law 875 asked States and locals to develop plans and organizations 
to cope with disasters, it, for the first time, mandated that States and local authorities 
better prepare and plan for disasters.  It also signaled to the States that Federal assistance 
would no longer be automatic or just a phone call away.  All Federal agencies were now 
responsible for following federal protocols and procedures before they could respond.  To 
complicate the matter even further, each Federal agency, to include DoD, would also 
have to create internal procedures as to how and when to render disaster assistance if 
requested.  The United States Federal disaster response had become institutionalized, 
more complex, more bureaucratic, and unfortunately unknowingly less responsive when 
States needed it most. 
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3. Military Institutionalization of Disaster Response 
For DoD, Public Law 875 ended their role as unofficial disaster responder of 
choice.  It codified what the military had been asked to do as a Federal agency since the 
Chicago Fires of 1871; respond as a federal department to domestic disasters when 
called.  It also struck the first legal blow in the relationship between DoD and State civil 
authorities.  It now forced State governors to formally request assistance from the 
President, certify the need for assistance, and show that a “reasonable amount” of State 
and local resources had already been committed to the disaster.109 State governors could 
no longer simply ask the President for DoD disaster assistance without scrutiny over what 
actions they had first taken.  Worse yet, the Law seemed to prompt questions from 
Federal authorities as to why the state needed Federal assistance.  Was the reasons States 
needed disaster assistance because they did not properly plan and prepare?  Is that why 
they needed Federal and/or DoD assistance? 
Public Law 875, also led to the creation of the Federal Civil Defense 
Administration (FCDA) in 1953.  The DoD, as well as all other Federal agencies were 
now required to respond to domestic disasters at the direction of the FCDA, whom the 
President delegated the responsibility to carry out Public Law 875.110 By doing so, DoD 
resources and capabilities were treated as part of Federal disaster assistance system.  
Their unique response skills and capabilities were now only to be used if requested 
through the FCDA.  Public Law 875 gave DoD legislative justification to no longer 
considered itself an immediate responder during any disaster, to include catastrophic.  
During this time, the notion of DoD no longer considering itself an immediate responder 
began to crystallize in the minds of DoD, Federal, and State civil authorities. 
In 1956 the DoD formalized their domestic disaster response procedures in a new 
directive.111 This led to a more formalized military disaster response system.  The DoD 
named the Army as the lead service responsible for all DoD disaster assistance to civil 
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authorities.  The Army’s responsibilities included coordinating resources provided by the 
Air Force and Navy.  DoD even institutionalized their request for assistance procedures.  
Appeals for military disaster assistance would need to be requested through the state 
governor by way of a FCDA Regional Administrators and then passed along to an Army 
area commander.  The appropriate Army commander would then coordinate disaster 
assistance if available.  If resources were not available then the Army area commander 
would contact the Continental Army Commander to request resources from other 
regional commands.112 In cases where a local installation commander received a request 
from civil authorities that confirmed life or property was in danger, the commander was 
given authority to respond.  This “immediate response” authority was intended to save 
lives, prevent human suffering and the destruction of property.113 
Through the 1950s, the DoD continued to respond to domestic disasters, though 
not catastrophic.  In 1957 Carter L. Burgess, the Assistant Secretary of Defense 
(Manpower, Personnel and Reserve) and member of the Commission on Government 
Security wrote, “The Armed Forces are as vital to the nation in combating natural 
disasters as they are in defending against enemy attack.”114 He reaffirmed that the 
military would stand ready to respond to a disaster if called.  He mentioned how the 
military provided assistance to victims of Hurricanes Carol, Edna, and Hazel in 1954.  He 
also mentioned the military’s response in 1955 to the floods of the Pacific Coast.  During 
the floods the DoD assisted in evacuations, reinforced levees, and furnished food, 
housing, and medical services.115 
4. Response Protocols Tested 
However, as the 1960s came and went, the new response protocols and disaster 
response procedures set out in Public Law 875 and military directives were tested, often 
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failed, were ignored, or modified.  The tendency was that during disasters, those 
requiring the assistance (States and local communities) did not use established protocols 
mandating they work through multiple agencies in order to receive desperately needed 
resource from DoD.  This was especially true during the first few chaotic days after a 
disaster occurred. 
In a 1968 study for the Office of Civil Defense, Office of the Secretary of the 
Army Professor William A. Anderson discussed, “…the involvement of the military in 
disaster, and the nature of military-civilian relations when such involvement occurs.”116 
He noted, that of 48 field studies conducted by the Disaster Research Center (DRC) from 
1963-1968, the military was involved in almost every large scale disaster.117 Consistent 
with present day disaster response philosophy, Professor Anderson found that the value 
system of American society widely held, “…that local problems, including those created 
by disaster, ought to be solved through civilian governmental structure and organization, 
and that non-civilian means [military] should be turned to only if it appears that civilian 
resources will be inadequate.”118 
Anderson also found that coordination between military and civilian authorities 
and channeling of civil requests for military assistance were problems as well.  Anderson 
noted that coordination issues stemmed from the lack of understanding military and 
civilian organizations had of one another in part due to each member of the respective 
organization bringing their “special perspective” to the event, often times hampering 
coordination.119 Adding to coordination problems was the overly layered request for 
assistance procedures that slowed the military’s response.  Anderson’s diagram below 
partially shows the layers local and State authorities needed to go through to receive DoD 
assistance:120 
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Figure 1.   Military Assistance Request Flow 
What Anderson did not include in his diagram was that per the Public Law 875 
State civil authorities also needed to go through the FCDA, which later split into the 
Office of Civil Defense and the Office of Emergency Planning in 1961, to request 
military assistance who would then task the DoD.121 The request process was frustrating 
and time consuming.  It was too far detached from those needing the assistance and those 
providing it.  Anderson noted that civilian officials did not, “…understand the channels to 
use in seeking military aid, nor the need to follow formal procedures.”122 He stated that 
local officials did not want to move through the State and Federal hierarchy in order to 
request military assistance.  Instead an informal military request system was adopted, in 
1960 when Hurricane Carla flooded Denton, Texas, to improve military response.123 As 
illustrated below, the request for assistance process was informally simplified to go 
straight from local authorities to the Army Liaison.124 
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Figure 2.   Simplified Military Assistance Request Flow 
5. Disaster Relief Act of 1970 
a. Increased Federal power 
On December 31, 1970 Congress passed the Disaster Relief Act of 1970.  
This was partly due to the major problems highlighted in the domestic response to 
Hurricane Camille.  Camille was a category five hurricane that devastated the Gulf Coast 
in 1969.  The Act expanded on the type of grants the Federal government would provide 
to individuals and State and local authorities. It included provisions that authorized grants 
to rebuild State and local facilities and food coupons and unemployment assistance to 
victims. 125 It also stated that the President would appoint an FCO who would operate 
under the Office of Emergency Preparedness responsible for the coordination and 
administration of Federal disaster relief efforts.126 However, the greatest assertion of 
Federal involvement in the Disaster Relief Act of 1970 came under Sec. 221 
PREDISASTER ASSISTANCE which stated: 
If the President determines that a major disaster is imminent, he is 
authorized to use Federal departments, agencies, and instrumentalities, and 
all other resources of the Federal Government to avert or lessen the effects 
of such disaster before its actual occurrence.127 
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For the DoD this meant that they could be called in to assist prior to a 
disaster based on the President’s orders.  For the States it meant that the President could 
send in Federal Assistance, to include the DoD, into a State without prior invitation or 
consent from the governor.  There are no known cases of this occurring in the 4 years up 
to the passing of the Disaster Relief Act of 1974 which removed this authority.128 
However, it did set a precedent that would be revisited after Hurricane Katrina impacting 
the relationship between DoD and State civil authorities. 
b. Increased State Disaster Responsibilities 
In addition to granting more authority to the President, the Disaster Relief 
Act of 1970 increased the States’ responsibility to prepare for and respond to disasters.  
In Sec 206 of the Act the President was authorized to grant up to $250,000 to States for 
the purpose of “…developing comprehensive plans and practicable programs for 
preparation against major disasters, and for relief and assistance to individuals, 
businesses, and local governments following such disasters.”129 In order to qualify for 
these grants, States had to designate or create a qualified agency that could plan and 
administer their program and submit their State disaster relief plan to the President.  Each 
State would need to appoint an SCO that would work with an FCO in case of a 
disaster.130 These provisions were intended to increase State and local preparedness and 
response capabilities and make the States more self reliant.  Unfortunately, the provisions 
also negated the need for State civil authorities to maintain any disaster support 
relationship with DoD. 
c. Decreased DoD Focus on Disaster Response 
For the DoD, improved State and local preparedness translated to less and 
less of a need to maintain their relationship with State civil authorities since their 
participation in disaster response was waning.  It also meant the DoD could focus more 
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on its primary mission, defending the nation from outside threats.  During most of the 
1970s DoD was responsible for the Defense Civil Preparedness Agency (DCPA) which 
the Federal government created to implement a dual-use philosophy for the use of 
disaster funds.  For the first time civil defense funds could be shared with State and local 
governments for the use of civil defense as well as natural disaster preparedness.131 
However during the Ford Administration, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld made 
clear that, “…the Federal government should address only attack preparedness, while 
peacetime disasters were a State and local responsibility.”132 This did not bode well for 
many State officials. 
E. DIVESTMENT BETWEEN DOD AND THE STATES (1971-1992) 
1. Tensions between DoD and State Officials and the Creation of FEMA 
As the 1970s wore on, conflicts between State officials and DoD over DCPA 
policy priorities intensified.133 Governors felt that there needed to be more emphasis on 
peacetime disasters and not national security.  In 1977, the National Governors 
Association applied pressure to the Federal government.  They wanted more focus on 
"comprehensive emergency management" which included peacetime disasters.134 Again 
DoD felt that this was a State responsibility, not a DoD responsibility.  This continued to 
corrode the virtually non existent relationship between DoD and State civil authorities.  
On June 19, 1978 Congress acted and created the Federal Emergency Management 
Agency (FEMA) through Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1978.  According to a 
Presidential executive order issued in July of 1979, the Director of FEMA was now 
responsible for, among other things: 
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• Establish[ing] Federal policies for, and coordinate, all civil defense and 
civil emergency planning, management, mitigation, and assistance 
functions of Executive agencies 
• Working with State and local governments and private sector to stimulate 
vigorous participation in civil emergency preparedness, mitigation, 
response, and recovery programs. 135 
With FEMA taking on the federal civil defense and emergency management role 
for the nation, the DoD was now able to divest itself from its direct civil defense and 
peacetime domestic disaster response role.  This led to the severing of all direct DoD ties 
with State civil defense and emergency management officials.  The DoD turned its full 
attention to protecting the Nation from external enemies.  It no longer needed to fetter 
with domestic response planning or coordination with State civil authorities.  The 
Creation of FEMA also negated the requirement for State civil authorities to work with 
DoD for their disaster response planning and budgeting needs.  States were now required 
to work all issues through FEMA even in the event of a catastrophic disaster.  This was 
despite history proving that only DoD had the capabilities and resources to respond to an 
overwhelming catastrophic disaster. 
2. Executive Order 1256 and The 1988 Stafford Act 
In November of 1988 Executive Order 12656, Assignment of Emergency 
Preparedness Responsibilities, refocused some of DoDs attention back into the domestic 
response arena.  Executive Order 12656 was intended to ensure the United States had 
sufficient capabilities, “…at all levels of government to meet essential defense and 
civilian needs during any national security emergency.”136 In its definition of national 
security emergency, it included natural disaster, military attack, technological emergency, 
or any other emergency that threatened national security.  The head of each federal 
department or agency needed to develop appropriate plans for response and coordinate 
those plans with State and local government agencies.  In addition, they were to assist 
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State and locals in developing their own plan “…for mitigating the effects of national 
security emergencies and for providing services that are essential to a national 
response…”137 
Also in November 1988, Congress passed The Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief 
and Emergency Assistance Act.  For the first time, the Congress added a section entitled 
“Utilization of DoD Resources.” This enabled Governors to request from the President 
DoD resources for use in the performance of emergency work.  Emergency work was 
defined as the clearance and removal of debris and wreckage and temporary restoration 
of essential public facilities and services.138 Executive Order 12656 and the additions to 
the 1988 Stafford Act where to become foretelling signs signaling the revival of DoDs 
crucial domestic catastrophic disaster response role and serve as a reminder that a solid 
relationship between DoD Title 10 and State civil authorities was critical in facilitating an 
immediate DoD disaster response. 
3. Warning Signs Not Fully Recognized 
In 1989 two major disasters hit the United States, Hurricane Hugo struck the 
Virgin Islands and the Carolina’s and the Loma Prieta Earthquake shook California.  The 
DoDs main response occurred in the Virgin Islands.  After both disasters, the Federal 
response (mainly FEMAs) effort received intense criticism.139 Due to the dissatisfaction 
with the response to Hurricane Hugo, FEMA published the Federal Response Plan (FRP) 
in April 1992.  The FRPs purpose was to, “…facilitate the delivery of all types of Federal 
response assistance to States to help them deal with the consequences of significant 
disasters.”140 The FRP was broken down into policies, situations, concept of operations, 
response actions, and responsibilities.  It, for the first time, listed 12 ESFs headed by a 
pre-designated primary Federal agency.  ESFs were intended to be functional areas of 
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response activities, such as transportation or communication that a primary Federal 
agency would use to facilitate the delivery of assistance in an effort to supplement State 
and local response.141 
As for the DoD, the FRP contained the following statement defining the role of 
the DCO.  It stated: 
The Defense Coordination Officer (DCO) function is supported by DoD.  
The DCO is provided by the DoD to serve in the field as the point of 
contact to the FCO and the ESFs regarding requests for military 
assistance.  The DCO and staff coordinate support and provide liaison to 
the ESFs.142 
The FRP also listed DoD as the primary agency for ESF #3, Public Works and 
Engineering and ESF #9 Urban Search and Rescue.  DoD was listed as a supporting 
agency for all other ESFs.  Overall, the FRP did not adequately capture DoDs traditional 
involvement in catastrophic disaster responses nor did it contain guidance as to how to 
adequately employ their resources for the best benefit of State and local authorities.  It 
continued to emphasize that all disaster response coordination was done through FEMA. 
F. CONCLUSION 
Historically, the Federal military’s response to domestic disasters was expected, 
accepted, and welcomed by civil authorities.  It was also free of bureaucratic complexity. 
These factors enabled the military to respond immediately to catastrophic disasters.  The 
military’s ability and willingness to respond to these events was galvanized by the 
relationships they maintained with civil authorities.  Those relationships were based on 
the military’s geographic dispersion and presence throughout the Nation.  Military 
commanders such as Sheridan and Funston were seen as part of the community and 
maintained close relationships with civil authorities.  They were not restricted by 
bureaucratic response procedures that added complexity or slowed their response.  The 
military’s solid relationship with civil authority and their simplistic response decision 
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matrix enabled them to render immediate assistance to disaster victims knowing it would 
be welcomed and/or expected by civil authorities. 
As time moved on, issues over reimbursement of military disaster response 
expenditures and the military’s rightful role in disaster response slowly encouraged the 
implementation of bureaucratic disaster assistance.  After 1950, the military could 
respond to domestic disaster by exception only.  Massive response efforts such as those 
needed for catastrophic events became bogged down by legislative restrictions and 
complex doctrinal procedures.  The new way of dealing with disasters slowly corroded 
the relationships Federal military commanders once maintained with State and local civil 
authorities. 
Eventually, tensions rose between the DoD and State civil authorities over how 
domestic disaster response should be facilitated.  The DoD concerned itself with civil 
defense leaving all other disaster preparation and response up to the States.  The States 
disagreed with DoD and insisted the Federal government do more to assist them in 
preparing for all hazards.  During this time, the Federal government passed disaster 
legislation that created FEMA who was responsible for coordinating all federal assistance 
to States.  It redefined DoDs domestic disaster response role reducing it to a supporting 
response agency of last resort.  In addition, the legislation provided financial incentives to 
States if they created a State disaster office that would work with the Federal disaster 
agency adding an additional layer of separation between DoD and State civil authorities. 
By 1992, DoDs domestic disaster role was seen as negligible at best by the 
Federal government, DoD, and State civil authorities.  A once ingrained relationship 
between Federal military high command, and State civil authorities had virtually 
disappeared.  There was no requirement to maintain neither a disaster response 
relationship nor a perceived need for that relationship.  Unfortunately, this was to prove 
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IV. IMPROVING RELATIONSHIPS TO IMPROVEVE RESPONSE 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter examines DoD Title 10 initial response to Hurricane Andrew and 
Katrina.   It describes DoDs Title 10 heroic efforts and contributions during both 
disasters.  It highlights how thousands of Federal troops responded to both disasters and 
how they employed military ships, aircraft, and other equipment to rescue, shelter, feed, 
and treat a multitude of disaster victims. 
This chapter also describes how DoDs initial response to both catastrophic 
disasters was categorized as slow.  It examines how post Hurricane Andrew debates over 
increasing the military’s role in domestic disaster arena as a way to improve response 
took focus away from a more critical issue; how to improve the relationship between 
DoD Title 10 forces and State civil authorities?  It asserts that a pre-existing collaborative 
relationship could have improved States’ knowledge of DoD response capabilities, 
removed State hesitation to ask for DoD assistance, and improved DoD anticipatory 
response actions.  It also discusses how months after Andrew, the debate over DoDs Title 
10 domestic disaster role subsided.  The end result was a heated debate, no change in 
DoDs role in the domestic disaster arena, no improvement in the relationship between 
DoD and State civil authorities, and a slow DoD Title 10 initial response to Hurricane 
Katrina 13 years later. 
This chapter concludes by examining post Katrina renewal of the debate over 
whether an increased military role in the domestic disaster arena would improve 
response.  It discusses how the issue over the military’s role became politically charged 
and quickly turned into debate over if DoD or State civil authorities should be in control 
of catastrophic disaster response.  Finally, it examines how the debate as it did post 
Andrew diverted attention away from the issue of improving DoD Title 10 response. 
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B DOD TITLE 10 HURRICANE ANDREW AND KATRINA 
PARTICIPATION 
1. DoD Title 10 Hurricane Andrew Participation 
In August of 1992, Hurricane Andrew swept across the Gulf Coast leaving behind 
a devastating path of destruction.  It left 20 people dead, destroyed 80,000 homes and 
reached an estimated recovery cost of 1.98 billion in 1992 dollars.143 DoD’s efforts were 
impressive once they responded to Hurricane Andrew.  They brought to bear resources 
and capabilities that only DoD could provide on such a large scale.  The DoD sent over 
22,800 Title 10 personnel to Florida and Louisiana to assist with Hurricane Andrew 
response and relief efforts.144 The DoD employed everything from Navy ships to Marine 
helicopters.  These assets supplied over 1.9 thousand tons of food products to area Mobile 
Kitchens Trailers (MKTs) which served some 900,000 meals.145 The Army and Marines 
utilized 120 helicopters and delivered 3.5 million pounds of cargo to disaster victims.146 
The DoD also formed a Logistics Support Group, headed up by the Army, to assist in the 
distribution of relief supplies.  The Army established and operated three logistics depots 
that supported military, civilian, and federal organizations.  Their depots consolidated, 
stored, palletized, and distributed goods throughout much of the disaster area.147 
During Andrew Title 10 personnel also assisted in direct touch humanitarian aid 
which heavily impacted the people of many devastated communities.  Title 10 forces 
cleared six million cubic yards of debris, provided medical care to 67,000 civilians, and 
assisted in repairing 98 schools.148 They set up Life Support Centers (LSC) MKTs, tents, 
floors, cots, showers, bathrooms, medical services, recreation, and child care.  These 
                                                 
143McDonnell, 2. 
144 United States General Accounting Office, Disaster Assistance; DoD’s Support for Hurricane 
Andrew and Iniki and Typhoon Omar, Washington DC: United States General Accounting Office, June 
1993, 2. 
145 Department of the Army, Forces Command Hurricane Andrew Response: JTF Andrew AAR, 23. 
146 Ibid., 29. 
147 Ibid., 29. 
148 Department of the Army, Forces Command Hurricane Andrew Response: JTF Andrew AAR, 4. 
 53
LSCs housed, fed, and provided medical care for an average of 2,400 victims per day.149 
Soldiers went door to door to establish needs and provided information as to locations of 
LSCs and medical stations.  They also performed first aid and deterred looters as they 
patrolled neighborhoods.150 The DoDs efforts during Hurricane Andrew were 
monumental.  A General Accounting Office report stated that the military’s response to 
Hurricane Andrew was, “…highly effective in providing supplies and services and in 
establishing the infrastructure necessary to restore order and meet the immediate needs of 
victims.”151 
2. DoD Title 10 Hurricane Katrina Participation 
Thirteen years after Hurricane Andrew hit the Gulf Coast, Hurricane Katrina’s 
destruction dwarfed that of Andrew many times over requiring an even larger response 
by DoD Title 10 forces.  Katrina was described as, “an extraordinary act of nature that 
spawned a human tragedy…the most destructive natural disaster in American 
history…”152 as well as “…the most expensive natural disaster in U.S. history…”153 
After August 29, 2005 the day Katrina made landfall, approximately 90,000 square miles 
of land, an area the size of the United Kingdom was decimated.154 Hurricane Katrina 
destroyed some 300,000 homes.155 It left behind 118 million cubic yards of debris, 
estimated to consume the same space as a football field stacked over ten and a half miles 
high.  In addition, it caused 2.5 million power outages in Louisiana, Mississippi, and 
Alabama.  It contributed to the spilling of 7.4 million gallons of oil into the Gulf Coast 
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region’s waterways and cost 1,330 people their lives.  Over 777,000 people became 
displaced and over 2,000 reported as missing.156 The estimated economic loss brought on 
by Katrina was estimated to be between 125 to 150 billion dollars.157 
Just as the figures show, there is no doubt that Katrina was one of the Nation’s 
most devastating catastrophic disasters.  There is also little doubt in anyone’s mind that 
the military response to Hurricane Katrina was not only invaluable, it was also 
unavoidable.  In a testimony given by Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense, Paul 
McHale, he stated that “The Department of Defense’s response to the catastrophic effects 
of Hurricane Katrina was the largest military deployment within the United States since 
the Civil War.”158 Over 50,000 National Guard and 22,000 active-duty personnel 
responded to Katrina providing critical humanitarian relief that saved lives and eased 
much of the suffering.159 A report from the U.S. House of Representatives characterized 
the DoDs response as heroic crediting it with saving “…many, many lives.”160 
The amount of resources provided by the DoD during Katrina was daunting.  The 
military deployed 20 ships; 346 helicopters; and 68 fixed-wing aircraft.  They delivered 
26.6 million Meals Ready to Eat (MREs), treated 26,304 patients, flew 16,525 sorties, 
and rescued some 11,000 people.161 They made bases available for FEMA staging.162 
The Navy brought in bulldozers, medical supplies, water purification equipment, and 
transported enormous amounts of cargo and commodities into hurricane hit areas.  The 
military also used Navy ships as airports, patient treatment centers, and places of rest for 
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first responders who needed food, water, and a shower.163 Title 10 troops performed 
search and rescue missions, assisted with evacuations, distributed food, removed debris, 
and controlled traffic.164 They also provided heavy airlift for commodities, performed 
medical evacuations, and aided in the reopening of New Orleans and Gulfport airports.  
Response Groups deployed to the airports and restored navigation systems, lighting, and 
communication enabling aircraft to takeoff and land.165 Within 5 days of Hurricane 
Katrina hitting the Gulf Coast, the DoD was tasked to perform the below list of mission 
assignments: 
• Conduct search-and-rescue operations 
• Perform security-capabilities assessment and provide security-capabilities 
advice and technical assistance 
• Collect and evacuate live persons to temporary processing centers 
• Collect and remove bodies of deceased persons 
• Restore flood-control systems 
• Transport and distribute ice, water, food and medical supplies  
• Disease prevention and control 
• Planning for the quarantine of areas within New Orleans 
• Quartering and sustaining of FEMA headquarters support element and 
relief workers 
• Health and medical support 
• Debris removal 
• Restoration of basic utilities and key transportation routes (land and water) 
• Geospatial-surveillance products and evaluations 
• Logistical support at key air and sea distribution nodes 
• Temporary housing 
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• Long-range communications between headquarters nodes and 
firefighting166 
During Katrina the DoD was once again asked to undertake a mission the Army 
had traditionally performed numerous times during disaster responses in the 19th and 
early 20th century.  FEMA asked DoD to undertook the challenge of massive logistics 
support.  Although commodities, supplies, and logistics were a FEMA responsibility 
during a disaster, FEMA Director Brown wanted the DoD to take over all logistics during 
Katrina.  Ken Burris, FEMAs Acting Director of Operations stated that, “The FEMA 
logistics capability has been overwhelmed,” and that he “wants DoD to take over 
logistics operations in Louisiana and Mississippi.”167 Since DoD was a support agency 
for all ESFs in the NRP, DoD asked FEMA to modify their request so as not to assume a 
primary agency role.  Ultimately DoD provided “significant assistance” to FEMAs 
logistics operations for Louisiana and Mississippi.  The Assistant Secretary of Defense 
called it possibly the single most complex civil support mission in DoDs history.168 
C. DOD TITLE 10 SLOW RESPONSE TO HURRICANE ANDREW AND 
KATRINA 
1. DoD Title 10 Slow Response to Hurricane Andrew 
Unfortunately, even though DoDs response to Hurricane Andrew was seen as a 
godsend, its initial response was characterized as slow.  The first Title 10 assets did not 
arrive in Florida until four days after Hurricane Andrew made landfall.  Kate Hale, Dade 
County Director of Emergency Operations during Hurricane Andrew lashed out at the 
slow response in frustration and stated, “Where the hell is the cavalry on this one?”169 
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DoD was criticized for its slow response and marked as being, “…better equipped to help 
foreign countries than fellow citizens…”  There were accusations that delays were 
partially due to political in action based on tensions between the Florida’s Governor's 
office and the President’s administration.170 For example, it took Governor Chiles of 
Florida three days to ask for DoD Title 10 assistance.  He stated on August 28, 1992 that 
the reason he did not ask for military assistance was that he, “…didn’t think it was 
necessary.”  The Governor’s reluctance to call for Title 10 assets heavily contributed to 
DoDs slow response.  When the Governor finally made the formal request for Federal 
troops, he asked for reserve units that were not eligible to be called up.  His lack of 
knowledge as to how to request assistance and what assistance DoD could render also 
delayed response.  Even though the Governor asked for reserve units, the White House 
took the request to mean Federal troops and within 24 hours federal solders were on the 
ground in Florida.171 
Once the DoD Title 10 assets were sent in to respond to Hurricane Andrews, DoD 
assistance faced other challenges leading to further delays.  Some delays were attributed 
to the lack of knowledge of DoDs request for assistance process by other Federal 
agencies.  Some Federal officials did not understand that DoD assistance had to be 
coordinated through ESFs primary Federal agencies and approved by the FCO.172 Since 
DoD assistance had to be coordinated and requested through FEMA, many DoD assets 
were slow to arrive.  In addition, FEMA as well as Florida did not know what response 
capabilities DoD possessed.  Florida did not have the assets to conduct rapid damage 
assessment after Hurricane Andrew hit.  This limited the number of requests for DoD 
assistance during the first few days of the catastrophe because no one knew the scope and 
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the severity of the damage.173 Had Florida knonw DoD had extensive damage assessment 
capabilities, they could have requested those assets, known the extent of the damage, and 
asked for DoD assistance sooner.  Finally, DoD response was categorized as slow 
because DoD took few actions prior to President Bush’s Presidential declaration because 
they had multiple budgetary and legal concerns.  DoD was concerned that if they took 
predatory steps prior to activation, they would not be reimbursed.174 They were also 
concerned about overstepping legal restrictions that governed their domestic response.  
Governor Chiles witnessed this first hand when he requested an Army engineering 
battalion and was denied days before President Bush gave the order for DoD Title 10 
assets to deploy.175 
The tragedy was that many DoD units stood ready to assist immediately following 
Hurricane Andrew’s destructive blow.  One officer quoted in the Washington Post stated, 
“The military people here are pulling their hair out saying, ‘What more can we do?’ 
We’re leaning so far forward we’re about to hit our nose on the floor.”  In Louisiana, an 
Army company was sent to Barksdale Air Force Base with generators waiting for 
someone to request their use.176  Unfortunately, these units were not able to respond until 
days after Andrew struck because of the lack of an official tasking. 
2. DoDs Title 10 Slow Response to Hurricane Katrina 
Even though DoDs efforts proved instrumental during Katrina, there were once 
again problems with DoDs initial response.  Just as with Hurricane Andrew, DoDs initial 
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response was characterized as slow.  Their slow response was partly attributed to DoD 
following pre-established procedures geared towards major disasters.  These procedures 
proved inadequate for a catastrophic disaster.177 The DoD prepared to respond to Katrina 
as they had done in the past by taking routine pre-hurricane actions.  They essentially 
waited, as was required of them, for someone to request their assistance.  Since 
Louisiana’s Governor did not realize the extent of Katrina’s damage, she did not 
specifically ask for Title 10 assistance.  She followed much the same course of action as 
Florida’s Governor had done during Andrew.  When Louisiana’s Governor did ask for 
Title 10 assistance, it was asked for through various means, none of which followed the 
established procedures set out by The Stafford Act, the National Response Plan, or DoD 
guidance.  Louisiana requested federal military assistance through their National Guard 
Bureau.178 They also directly asked White House officials for military assistance.179 The 
Governor eventually asked the President directly on multiple occasions to send 
everything he had to include 40,000 Federal troops.180 One post Katrina finding sited 
Governor Blanco as submitting, “…an inadequate and erroneous request for assistance to 
the President…”181 
DoDs initial response was also slowed due to having to wait for official requests 
for assistance from DHS and FEMA.  Just as with Andrew, FEMA was overwhelmed, the 
States went to FEMA for assistance, and FEMA was slow to ask DoD for assistance.  
Since the DoD operated under a pull system that provided assistance only after requests 
were asked for, Title 10 resources were not committed during the first few days of 
Katrina’s response.  Outside the DoD, FEMA and State officials partially blamed DoDs 
request for assistance process for why requests were not made to DoD.  Many were 
frustrated with or did not know how to “properly” request DoD assistance.  Colonel 
Richard Chavez, U.S. Air Force, Senior Military Advisor for Civil Support, testified that, 
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FEMA officials did not always have a good understanding of what assets and resources 
DOD could provide…”  They also did not understand, “…DOD’s processes for 
responding to FEMA’s requests for assistance.”182 
DoDs “21 step” request for assistance process which according to DoDD 3025.15 
requires DoD to review each request for legality, lethality, risk to DoD forces, cost, 
appropriateness, and impact to DoD readiness was characterized as overly bureaucratic 
adding to DoDs slow response.  This resulted in cases of unfilled critical needs due to the 
lack of support.183 DoDs “21 step” process was seen as too cumbersome.  Many officials 
did not understand DoDs request process or chose to ignore it.  This was apparent even 
within DoD.  General Richard Myers, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff stated, “I 
don’t know if we have a 21-step process or not.  If we do, it’s one that takes 21 seconds 
to complete.” Even Assistant Secretary of Defense McHale stated, “I can tell you, in a 
crisis, there are no 21 steps for approval.” Also within the DoD General Honore, the 
Commanding General, First U.S. Army took the Chairman’s words to heart and ignored 
the 21 step process.  He made personal requests to his fellow generals, some of whom 
deployed resources.184 
DoDs slow response was also attributed the lack of visibility they had over the 
amount of damage caused by Katrina.  DoD was seen as situationally unaware during the 
first few days after Katrina made landfall.  One finding stated that, “…the Department of 
Defense lacked timely and accurate information about the immediate impact of Hurricane 
Katrina.  DOD and DHS did not coordinate adequately for the use of DOD assets to make 
such assessments during this period.” Instead of using DoD assets to assess the 
immediate devastation Katrina had consummated, the DoD relied primarily on media 
reports to gather information about Katrina.  This caused many senior DoD officials to 
not learn about New Orleans’ breached levees until days after they had ruptured.185  In 
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essence, DoDs lack of situational awareness led them to rely on DHS and the media for 
information and FEMA for requests of support instead of immediately working with the 
States to dispatch damage assessment assets.  This considerably slowed DoDs preparation 
and response posture just as it had done during Hurricane Andrew. 
Finally, DoDs slow initial response after Katrina was attributed to a “cultural 
reluctance” on DoDs part to commit assets and for DoDs lack of planning for a critical 
role in a catastrophic disaster.186 Scott Wells, Louisiana’s FCO during Katrina made this 
statement about the DoD, “It’s hard to get them to do anything where there is a chance of 
failure…They could have played a faster and bigger role.”187 
D. POST HURRICANE ANDREW DEBATE OVER INCREASED DOD 
TITLE 10 ROLE IN DOMESTIC DISASTER ARENA 
1. Post Hurricane Andrew Recommendations to Improve DoD Title 10 
Response 
Reports issued after Hurricane Andrew enumerated a litany of findings and 
recommendations that extended beyond DoDs slow response.  Many centered round 
FEMA and how to improve its response capabilities.  However, some reports generated 
recommendations aimed at improving DoD Title 10s initial response.  A General 
Accounting Office report made several recommendations.  It suggested that legislation be 
changed that allowed Title 10 reservists to be activated in the event of a catastrophe.188 
At the time of Hurricane Andrew, Section 673b (b) of title 10 did not allow reservists to 
be activated during man-made or natural disasters.189 During Andrew reserve units could 
not be activated even though their resources were needed.  The report also recommended 
that the Stafford Act be changed to allow pre-event planning by Federal Agencies.  This 
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would allow the DoD to preposition assets, assemble units, and take other preparatory 
actions prior to a presidential disaster declaration without risking reimbursement.190 
An Army Forces Command After Action Report (FORCECOM AAR) went 
further than the General Accounting Office report.  It recommended that FEMA and DoD 
rewrite disaster plans to reflect DoD initial response requirements.  It advocated giving 
the DoD provisions that would allow for automatic response to a catastrophic disaster 
such as a category 4 or 5 hurricane or a 7.0 earthquake occurring in a populated area.191 
The FORCECOM AAR also called for DoD to develop Joint Service disaster relief 
doctrine, better disaster relief plans and the development of “push packages” that would 
be ready if an automatic response was required.192 These provisions did not exist when 
Andrew struck. 
2. Post Andrew Debate over DoD Title 10 Having an Increased Role in 
the Domestic Disaster Arena 
The recommendation made by the FORCECOM AAR, that the DoD be given a 
greater role in domestic disaster response, received much attention.  A Congressional 
hearing on the response to Andrew included testimony by experts who advocated an 
increased role for the military in disaster response.  It was widely held that the military 
should lead and coordinate disaster response damage assessment in the critical first 24 
hours after a disaster.  The assistant comptroller general of the General Accounting 
Office stated that, "The military is the only game in town to come in quickly and 
effectively after a mega-disaster like Andrew…For catastrophic disasters affecting large 
numbers of people, the military possesses a unique capacity to bring substantial resources 
and expertise to bear.  And we run the risk that if such help does not come quickly, lives 
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may be lost."193 Senator Bob Graham of Florida advocated that the federal government 
be given the power to mobilize the military after a catastrophic disaster prior to State 
authorities requesting Title 10 assistance.  He insisted that the military’s speed, 
discipline, and hate for paperwork made it, “…uniquely able to augment disaster 
response efforts…”  He ultimately advocated that military personnel training be 
reoriented to include disaster response.194 
Two former FEMA advisory board members went much further than Senator 
Graham.  They called for a military takeover of domestic disaster response and for the 
disbandment of FEMA.  They specifically wanted DoD to take over responsibility for 
domestic disaster planning and logistics.  They went as far as to say that a lieutenant 
general be made director of operations for such an agency so ties with the Pentagon 
would remain strong.  These officials reasoned that, “Giving the military responsibility 
for disaster relief would not only be good for the country, it would be good for the troops, 
giving them a meaningful mission to maintain their cutting edge.”195 
However, not everyone agreed that the military should have an increased role in 
the domestic disaster arena, let alone lead the effort.  The then director of FEMA, 
Wallace E. Stickney warned that a, “…military takeover of emergency management…” 
was a "…dicey proposition that gets into complex questions about federal-state relations 
and about how other nations have fared under military top-down solutions in natural 
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disasters."196 A 1993 General Accounting Office report agreed with Mr. Stickney.  It 
stated, “…we do not advocate turning over the entire disaster response, relief, and 
recovery operation to the military.  DOD’S role in disaster response needs to remain 
under the direction of a civilian authority…”  It cautioned that giving DoD the domestic 
disaster mission could detract from its primary responsibilities and that it might look as if 
the military is making or directing domestic policy.  This, according to the report, would 
run, “...contrary to principles that have guided the military’s role in the United States.”197 
In addition to the General Accounting Office report, the National Academy of Public 
Administration’s congressionally mandated report also made recommendations opposing 
the military’s increased role in the domestic disaster arena.  It voted “no” to: 
• The transfer of FEMA to DOD 
• The Armed Forces having a larger role in disaster response 
• The Armed Forces taking on the role of coordinating emergency 
management and disaster response198 
The post Andrew debate over whether the military should take an increased role 
in disaster response eventually faded.  The military did not want the additional mission 
and the States and two government reports opposed the military’s increased role in the 
disaster response arena.  So the government focused on strengthening FEMA.  James L. 
Witt was appointed in 1993 by President Clinton as FEMAs new director.  Witt was hired 
to reform and streamline FEMAs disaster relief and recovery operations. 199 He took 
FEMA in a new direction.  This took the response spotlight off of DoD which ended the 
debate over giving them an increased role in the domestic disaster arena.  Once again, 
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order was restored and everyone was back in their “emergency response lane.”  DoD 
returned its focus to national security.  FEMA focused on reinventing how it would 
respond to the next catastrophe. The States focused on ways to better prepare themselves 
before the next “big one” hit. 
Unfortunately, the debate over DoDs role in the disaster arena resulted in some 
unintended consequences.  It took the focus away from discussing ways to improve DoD 
response.  Those involved failed to address a key issue: what should be done to build a 
collaborative response relationship between DoD Title 10 and State civil authorities.  
This issue should have been evident considering that the events of Hurricane Andrew 
exemplified how the poor relationship between DoD and State civil authorities impeded 
DoDs initial response.  First, Florida’s Governor hesitated for three days before he asked 
for Title 10 assets.  Had he not hesitated, DoD assets could have responded earlier.  
Second, Florida civil authorities demonstrated a lack of knowledge as to what response 
capabilities DoD possessed and which they could legally request.  Had State civil 
authorities known about and requested DoDs damage assessment capabilities, response 
could have been accelerated.  Finally, DoD did not prepare for and anticipate State needs.  
Had they done so, they could have employed DoD response resources days earlier. 
Instead of focusing on the causal factors that led to DoDs poor response, the 
debate masked this key issue.  This diversion ultimately led to no change in DoDs role in 
the domestic disaster arena, no improvement in the relationship between DoD and State 
civil authorities, and a slow DoD Title 10 initial disaster response to Hurricane Katrina 
13 years caused by nearly the same factors as Andrew.  As with Andrew, during Katrina 
the Governor hesitated to ask for military, the State had limited knowledge of DoD 
response capabilities, and DoD Title 10 took few preparatory actions in anticipation of 
their required response. The only difference this time was that it was the people of 
Louisiana not Florida who had to waited for the “cavalry” to respond. 
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3. Post Hurricane Katrina Recommendations to Improve DoDs Title 10 
Response 
Post Hurricane Katrina, there were even more recommendations and findings then 
those cast out during Andrew.  Many recommendations focused on ways to improve 
DoDs response.  One report stressed DoD and DHS improve their interagency 
coordination.  It recommended DHS officials receive training on DoD capabilities and 
authorities during emergencies.  It also recommended that both agencies increase the 
number of exchange officials at headquarter levels in areas such as planning, training, 
and exercising.200 Other recommendations centered round better integration of Title 10 
forces with National Guard forces during catastrophic disasters.  It was recommended 
that USNORTHCOM and the National Guard Bureau (NGB) expand the number of 
Guard personnel at USNORTHCOM and integrate them into planning, training, and 
exercising, and response efforts.201 In addition, recommendations stated that, “DOD 
should consider chartering the NGB as a joint activity of the DOD.”  This would allow 
the NGB, to among other things provide better communication between DoD and each 
State’s Guard.202 
Some even recommended the DoD restructure in order to improve its disaster 
response.  One report stated that DoD should create six divisional units trained and ready 
to respond to catastrophic events in the United States.203 While a White House report 
made several controversial recommendations aimed at giving the DoD an increased or 
even a lead role in domestic disaster response.  It advocated that: 
• DOD and DHS should develop recommendations for revision of the NRP 
to delineate the circumstances, objectives, and limitations of when DOD 
might temporarily assume the lead for the Federal response to a 
catastrophic incident. 
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• DOD should revise its Immediate Response Authority (IRA) policy to 
allow commanders, in appropriate circumstances, to exercise IRA even 
without a request from local authorities.204 
4. Post Katrina Debate over DoD Title 10 Having an Increased Role in 
the Domestic Disaster Arena 
The recommendations to give DoD an increased role in the domestic disaster 
arena rekindled the debate that had died post Andrew.  This time it would be politically 
charged, and quickly turn into a battle over who would be in control of response.  Much 
the same unintended consequences would ensue as did during the post Andrew debate.  
The causal issues that contributed to DoDs slow initial response would be overlooked due 
to the emotions the control issue would insight. 
The seeds for this debate were planted on 15 September 2005 when President 
Bush addressed the nation from New Orleans.  It had only been 17 days since Hurricane 
Katrina made landfall, forever reshaping and changing the landscape and the lives of 
those who called New Orleans and much of the central coast home.  The President spoke 
of “fellow citizens left stunned and uprooted, searching for loved ones, and grieving for 
the dead, and looking for meaning in a tragedy that seems so blind and random.”  He also 
lamented about the, “…kind of desperation no citizen of this great and generous nation 
should ever have to know -- fellow Americans calling out for food and water, vulnerable 
people left at the mercy of criminals who had no mercy, and the bodies of the dead lying 
uncovered and untended in the street.”205 
The aftermath of Hurricane Katrina left the nation and the world at a loss.  Some 
were shocked by the devastating destruction that the storm wrought.  Others, to include 
President Bush, where shocked at what seemed an inadequate disaster response waged by 
the most powerful nation in the free world.  After all, how could a nation such as the 
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United States accept an estimated 1,330 deaths, 770,000 displaced persons and so much 
suffering within its own civilized and modern boarders?206 
President Bush made clear in his address that the United States normal disaster 
relief system was not equal to the task of responding to Katrina.  He stated that the 
disaster response “…system, at every level of government, was not well-coordinated, and 
was overwhelmed in the first few days.”  He went further to say, “It is now clear that a 
challenge on this scale requires greater federal authority and a broader role for the armed 
forces -- the institution of our government most capable of massive logistical operations 
on a moment's notice.” 
President Bush’s implication that the military should play a broader role in 
disaster response did not resonate well with many public officials, especially those 
concerned with States’ rights.  During a November 9, 2005 House of Representative 
Homeland Security Subcommittee Meeting, Chairman Dave Reichert (R-WA) voiced his 
concerns when it came to placing the military in a “…primary role in responding to 
catastrophic emergencies.”207 He cautioned that, “…under our Nation’s constitutional 
framework, state and local governments take the lead role in responding to disasters and 
emergencies, while the federal government and the military take a supporting role.” He 
stated, “As the former Sheriff of King County, Wash., I fear that an enhanced role for the 
military in responding to disasters and emergencies may undermine federalism…”208 
In addition to Representative Reichert, a great deal of wailing and gnashing of 
teeth came from state organizations and governors.  They vehemently opposed President 
Bush’s proposition of an increased military role in disaster response.  Within two months 
of one another The Council of State Governments, The National Emergency Management 
Association (NEMA) and The National Governors Association (NGA) all spoke out 
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against an increased role for the active military in disaster response.209 Some governors 
such as NGA Chairman Arkansas Governor Mike Huckabee did not mince words as he 
plainly stated his opposition to an increased military role in disaster response.  The 
Arkansas Governor stated: 
I haven't heard any governors say 'That's a great idea. I'll give up my 
power to an unelected general to oversee my state.' That would be a 
significant, almost revolutionary change in government policy and 
practice . . . You're going to have a pushback from governors, county 
executives, mayors, fire chiefs, police chiefs all up and down the 
emergency--management structure . . ."210 
Montana Governor Brian Schweitzer stated, "People in Washington, D.C. can yap all 
they want, but they're not going to undermine the constitution of the state of Montana."211 
As the argument became one of States’ rights and “who’s in charge” of response, 
it drew attention away from what needed be done in order to improve DoD Title 10 
response.  There was contention over who Title 10 and National Guard personnel would 
be led by if large numbers of both Title 10 and National Guard troops were deployed 
during a catastrophic disaster.  This argument specifically stemmed from the lack of 
coordination between Title 10 and National Guard personnel during Hurricane 
Katrina.212 The lack of coordination in part was blamed on a dual command structure 
where Title 10 troops were commanded by an active duty general and Guard troops were 
commanded by a Guard general negating the principle of unity of command.213 By 
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having two separate chains of command the governor was able to maintain control of 
National Guard assets under state and Title 32 status and the Secretary of Defense and the 
President retain control over Title 10 assets.  The problem was that the President and the 
DoD felt that the size of the military response by Federal and Guard troops warranted a 
single commander and the Governors of Louisiana and Mississippi dismissed the 
concern.  During Katrina, Governor Blanco refused to federalize the Guard and kept them 
under her control.214 This led to a lack of unity of effort between the Federal troops and 
the National Guard, a lack of situational awareness of National Guard by 
USNORTHCOM, and a reduction of efficiency as to how military forces were used 
during Katrina.  An example of this was when, “…FEMA requested assistance from 
DOD without knowing what State National Guard forces had already deployed to fill the 
same needs.”215 
A 2007 Congressional commission on the National Guard stated that the Guard 
should be better resourced by DoD and should be the primary organization responsible 
for responding to domestic catastrophic disasters.  It also stated that the Guard should 
remain under State control and if Title 10 forces were brought in then they should fall 
under the command of a dual hated National Guard commander.  In a memo signed by 
Secretary of Defense Gates responding to the commissions recommendations, he 
disagreed and stated that DoD Title 10 forces would remain under his and the Presidents 
control and not fall under State control. 
The post Hurricane Katrina political wrangling over the role of Title 10 forces in 
disaster response has been counterproductive.  It has increased an institutional wedge 
between DoD Title 10 and State civil authorities that once did not exist.  Instead of 
arguing over the response role of Title 10 forces and “who’s in charge”, DoD and State 
civil authorities should work on building a collaborative relationship so that Title 10 
response in support of States can be improved prior to the next catastrophic disaster.  
Currently, the argument has many states equating Title 10 response to mean Federal 
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control over disaster operations.  This sentiment was expressed by Governor Frank 
Keating of Oklahoma as he described his experience with the Oklahoma City Bombing in 
1995.  He stated, “Perhaps the strongest lesson from Oklahoma City…concerns the 
almost instinctive urge common to officials of federal agencies and the military to open 
the federal umbrella over any and all functions or activities.  Simply put, the federal 
government all too often acts like the 500-pound gorilla.”216 
The focus on “who’s in charge” has created animosity and suspicion between 
DoD and some States.  Instead of a marriage, the relationship is more in line with a not so 
cordial divorce.  As mentioned earlier, DoDs slow response to Katrina, as with Andrew, 
was in part due to the same factors: the governor’s hesitation to ask for Title 10 assets, 
the lack of knowledge on the part of civil authorities as to what response capabilities 
DoD possessed, and DoDs lack of anticipation, preparation, and knowledge as to the 
needs and expectations of the States. 
It is unfortunate that DoDs slow response to both disasters was attributable to 
many of the same causal factors.  However, it would be unconscionable if the debate over 
control continues to act as a barrier, preventing DoD and State civil authorities from 
building a collaborative relationship that would improve DoDs disaster response to the 
next catastrophic disaster.  It took 13 post Andrew years to remind DoD and the States 
that DoD is a critical, necessary, and required component in the Nation’s domestic 
response arena.  Therefore, before the next catastrophic disaster strikes DoD and State 
civil authorities need to build a collaborative relationship: 
• That moves past control 
• Encourages State civil authorities to ask for immediate DoD Title 10 
assistance 
• Facilitates the building of knowledge by both DoD and State civil 
authorities of each others response capabilities and limitations 
• Encourages DoD to anticipate responding and preparing for that response 
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The question now is what can be done to build a collaborative relationship 




















V. FINDINGS, RECOMMENDATIONS, AND CONCLUSION 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Chapter V concludes this thesis by presenting findings directed to answer why 
DoD Title 10 and State civil authorities do not currently have a collaborative domestic 
disaster response relationship.  It offers policy recommendations based on those findings.  
The recommendations are focused on how to create relationship building mechanisms 
that will lead to disaster response collaboration and move away from the issue of control.  
This is done with hopes that, if implemented, the recommendations will be used to 
improve DoD Title 10 response prior for the next domestic catastrophic disaster. 
B. FINDING: CURRENT STATUTES AND DOCTRINE DISCOURAGE 
COLLABORATIVE RELATIONSHIP BUILDING BETWEEN DOD 
TITLE 10 AND STATE CIVIL AUTHORITIES 
Current federal statues, executive orders, and DHS/DoD documents and directives 
are written in ways that discourage collaborative relationship building between DoD Title 
10 and State civil authorities.  The Stafford Act is the principle legal document that 
governs Federal and State government disaster responsibilities.  By doing so, it sets the 
tone for most other authoritative disaster documents.  For example, DHS and DoD 
documents and directives, such as the NRP and DoDD 3025.1 are written to comply with 
authorities and responsibilities enumerated in The Stafford Act.  The Stafford Act’s intent 
is, “…to provide an orderly and continuing means of assistance by the Federal 
Government to State and local governments in carrying out their responsibilities to 
alleviate the suffering and damage which result from such disasters.”217 Unfortunately, 
Congress placed provisions within The Stafford Act that unintentionally discourages 
relationship building between DoD and State civil authorities. 
There are two main provisions in The Stafford Act that discourage relationship 
building between DoD and State civil authorities.  First, FEMA is given the sole 
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responsibility to lead, coordinate, and partner with all agencies prior to and during 
domestic all disaster response and relief operations, to include those considered and/or 
characterized as catastrophic in nature.  Second, The Stafford Act does not have 
provisions that differentiate between a major and catastrophic disaster, therefore it never 
addresses the unique role DoD will play during catastrophic disasters.  The Stafford Act 
charters FEMA to: 
• Lead the Nation's efforts to prepare for, protect against, respond to, 
recover from, and mitigate against the risk of natural disasters, acts of 
terrorism, and other man-made disasters, including catastrophic incidents 
• Partner with State, local, and tribal governments and emergency response 
providers, with other Federal agencies, with the private sector, and with 
nongovernmental  
• Develop a Federal response capability that, when necessary and 
appropriate, can act effectively and rapidly to deliver assistance essential 
to saving lives or protecting or preserving property or public health and 
safety  
• Coordinate with…agencies and offices in the Department to take full 
advantage of the substantial range of resources  
• Provide funding, training, exercises, technical assistance, planning, and 
other assistance to build tribal, local, State, regional, and national 
capabilities218 
The above provisions set out in The Stafford Act make it clear that all entities, to 
include DoD and State civil authorities, work through FEMA.  DoD and State civil 
authorities have no requirement or incentive to build collaborative relationships amongst 
themselves.  It is therefore FEMA that partners with DoD; FEMA that partners with State 
civil authorities; FEMA that familiarizes itself with DoD capabilities, and FEMA that is 
responsible to understand what disaster assistance States may require.  The provisions in 
the Stafford Act simply nullify any reason nor provide any incentive for DoD and State 
civil authorities to build collaborative relationships without FEMA initiating such 
actions.  More poignantly, those provisions in The Stafford Act discourage direct 
relationship building between DoD and State civil authorities because doing so may be 
perceived by DHS as “stepping on FEMA’s toes” or “moving into FEMA’s lane”. 
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The second way The Stafford Act discourages DoD and State civil authorities 
from building a collaborative relationship is by not differentiating between a major and 
catastrophic disaster.  Hurricanes Andrew and Katrina proved that disasters of such 
magnitude must be treated and responded to differently than major disasters.  Yet, The 
Stafford Act still does not separate the two.  This has led to the lack of provisions that 
recognize DoDs increased support and response role during catastrophic disasters.  By 
not making a distinction in The Stafford Act that recognizes the difference between major 
and catastrophic disaster and DoDs increased role in the latter, there are few incentives to 
encourage DoD and State civil authorities to build a collaborative relationship aimed at 
improving DoD response. 
1. Recommendation: Amend Safford Act to Account for the Difference 
between Major and Catastrophic Disaster and DoDs Increased Role 
in the Latter 
The Stafford Act should be amended so that it accounts for the differences 
between major and catastrophic disasters and adds provisions that recognize DoDs 
increase role and responsibilities when responding to a catastrophic disaster.  As early as 
1993, Florida officials recognized a similar need after Hurricane Andrew devastated the 
Gulf Coast.  They recommended that state and local governments within Florida use 
minor, major, and catastrophic disaster categories when planning.  Florida officials 
defined major and catastrophic disasters as follows: 
• Major disasters means disasters that will likely exceed local capabilities 
and require a broad range of state and federal assistance, such as a 
category one to three hurricane. 
• Catastrophic disasters means disasters that will require massive state and 
federal assistance, including immediate military involvement, such as a 
category four or five hurricane that hits a densely populated area.219 
Florida officials specifically acknowledged that major and catastrophic disasters 
and response to such disasters were different.  They also acknowledged that catastrophic 
disaster response would include immediate military involvement.  Creating a separate 
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catastrophic disaster category within The Stafford Act, that recognizes the DoDs 
increased role and responsibilities during such an event, would institutionalize the 
requirement for DoD and State civil authorities to build a collaborative disaster response 
relationship. 
Under the current Stafford Act, a catastrophic disaster is considered no different 
than a major disaster.  During Andrew and Katrina, although both disasters were 
catastrophic, the Governors could only declare a major disaster.  Once the Governors 
realized the situation was grave they had no mechanism nor were there procedures in 
place to elevate the severity and immediately notifying all agencies that the response 
effort needed to be refocused in order to deal with a catastrophe.  Instead, it took days for 
DoD, State, and Federal authorities to change their response mindset.  By adding a 
catastrophic disaster category to The Stafford Act, it will signal or “trigger” to all 
responsible agencies that if declared substantial response will be needed, to include 
immediate response by DoD in support of the Governor.  For the Governor, it would be 
an acknowledgement that he/she expects and accepts DoD response under the pre-
established plans and procedures developed under the provisions of the catastrophic 
disaster category of The Stafford Act.  For the DoD, it will provide reassurance that State 
civil authorities understand and accept how they will respond because they will be doing 
according to the same plans and procedures State civil authorities State civil authorities 
agreed upon. 
To ensure those plans and procedures are in place, one provision under the 
catastrophic category should mandate increased disaster planning coordination between 
DoD and State civil authorities.  This will lead to increased communication, relationship 
building, and fulfill a critical need.  To illustrate the planning need, an exploratory review 
of State and local emergency response plans found little to no mention of how DoD 
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resources would be incorporated during a catastrophic response within a State.220 This is 
despite a 2006 the Nationwide Plan Review conducted by DHS revealing that, “The 
majority of the Nation’s current emergency operations plans and planning processes 
cannot be characterized as fully adequate, feasible, or acceptable to manage catastrophic 
events as defined in the National Response Plan (NRP).”221 This point was further 
emphasized by a 2006 Little Hoover Commission report that outlined essential steps 
California needed to take relating to leadership and planning for catastrophes.  They 
concluded that, “The State has not put in place the plans and strategies or designed and 
deployed the tools needed to respond to the inevitable catastrophic event.”222 It sited 
California’s Office of Emergency Services as admitting that California’s Emergency plan 
was not adequate and that a catastrophic event would overwhelm local government and 
the state’s mutual aid system.223 One step the committee recommended was for 
California to clarify the relationship between military force support during emergency 
response.  This would include what military assets were available and how to integrate 
those assets into the State’s emergency response strategy.224 
Finally, although controversial, the catastrophic disaster provision under the 
Stafford Act should include the critical acknowledgement that the DoD, under 
extraordinary circumstances, may be required to assume a leading disaster response role 
during the first few days of a catastrophic disaster.  This will force DoD, DHS, and States 
to deal with the rare eventuality of such an event.  Currently, DoD and State civil 
authorities are tiptoeing around, ignoring, or arguing over the issue because it is 
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politically sensitive versus tackling it head on.  If not addressed, tensions between DoD 
and State civil authorities will persist, straining an already virtually non existent 
relationship doing little to improve DoD catastrophic response. 
One Post Katrina report made it clear.  It stated, “…limitations under Federal law 
and DOD policy caused the active duty military to be dependent on requests for 
assistance.  These limitations resulted in a slowed application of DOD resources during 
the initial response.”225 If The Stafford Act is not amended and relationships not built, 
State reluctance to request DoD assets because of tensions over control will persist.  If 
recommendations in the same report such as, under certain circumstances DoD “push” 
resources to State and local governments without prior request are implemented in an 
effort to improve DoD response,226 without pre-established collaborative relationships, 
DoD response may actually be rejected by States.  Take for example when, at the end of 
2005, USNORTHCOM attempted to send in Lt. General Robert T. Clark into Florida 
prior to Hurricane Wilma.  Clark wanted to start flying in equipment and establish a Joint 
Task Force Command.  Florida’s Governor called Secretary Chertoff and complained, 
“…that the federal government’s unilateral actions were “insulting” to him…and all 
Florida citizens.”227 USNORTHCOM and DHS was simply attempting to “push” assets 
in and assist, but State civil authorities felt threatened and insulted because the Federal 
government and DoD was stepping on their toes.  Had a relationship between DoD and 
Florida civil authorities been established prior to Wilma, DoD intentions may have been 
better communicated and understood.  Instead, the lack of a relationship turned DoDs 
gesture of assistance into dispute over control of disaster operations.  Amending The 
Stafford Act to differentiate between major and catastrophic disasters ensuring to 
recognize DoDs role in the latter will force DoD and State civil authorities to collaborate 
and better plan and prepare for the inevitable resulting in an improved DoD response. 
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C. FINDING: THERE IS A NEED AND A DESIRE TO BUILD A 
COLLABORATIVE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DOD AND STATE 
CIVIL AUTHORITIES SO THAT DOD INITIAL RESPONSE CAN BE 
IMPROVED YET FEW MECHANISMS EXIST TO FOSTER THE 
RELATIONSHIP. 
DoDs slow response to Hurricanes Andrew and Katrina demonstrated the need for 
DoD and State civil authorities to build a collaborative relationship.  During those 
catastrophes, State civil authorities lacked knowledge of DoD capabilities and limitations.  
A FORCECOM AAR report stated that during Andrew, “many of the participants in the 
relief effort lacked familiarity with other agencies’ equipment, operational procedures, 
and capabilities in providing relief support.” Specifically, there was inadequate 
knowledge about the military’s damage assessment capability on the part of State 
agencies.228 During Katrina, DoDs slow response demonstrated that they lacked 
knowledge about State capabilities, requirements, and limitations.  In both cases, DoD 
was not prepared to respond immediately with the needed disaster resources.  In 2003, a 
Defense Science Board found that past DoD civil support problems, “…involved the 
coordination between military authorities and key local and state civil authorities…”229 
Three years later, a United States Government Accountability Office, “found a lack of 
understanding within the military and among federal, state, and local responders as to the 
types of assistance and capabilities that DOD might provide in the event of a 
catastrophe…some of the military’s available assets were never requested or proactively 
deployed.”230 This emphasizes the existing need for DoD Title 10 and State civil 
authorities to build relationships so that they can gain a better understanding of each 
others capabilities, requirements, and limitations, thereby improving DoD initial 
response. 
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The need has also been emphasized by both DoD and State civil authorities.  
DoDs newly revised, September 2007, Civil Support publication clearly states that there 
is a critical, “…need to establish workable and effective interagency relationships and 
partnerships, in advance of a crisis or contingency…”231 David Quam, the Federal 
Relations Director of the National Governors Association during a visit to 
USNORTHCOM stated, “NORTHCOM has a mission to protect the United States and 
the citizens thereof. It's a shared responsibility…It's great to be here to try to establish 
that partnership and the relationship we need to do that effectively."232 
In addition, two post Katrina studies showed that there was a lack of 
understanding by State civil authorities as to DoDs Title 10 role in disaster response, 
further indicating a need for the building of a collaborative relationship.  The first study 
published in 2006 by RAND surveyed local, state, and health authorities.  It indicated 
that the events of Hurricane Katrina, “…highlighted the differing expectations that state 
and local officials have with respect to the role of federal military and the National Guard 
in responding to a major catastrophe.”233 It went on to state that differing expectations of 
the military could have been in part due to the lack of knowledge of legal restrictions or 
even misunderstandings about roles and responsibilities of the military during domestic 
responses.234 Under the Posse Comitatus Act of 1878 federal military members are 
prohibited from conducting domestic law enforcement activities yet, 74% of local Office 
of Emergency Management (OEM) and 27% of state OEMs responded by saying they 
expected Federal troops to maintain order and provide security during a terrorism-related 
incident.235 Ironically DoDs 2007 Joint Publication 3-28 states that introducing federal 
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forces into a civil response requires a clear understanding of authorities and their limits 
because State officials may not understand those limits.236 
The second study specifically focused on how knowledgeable local Emergency 
Managers (EMs) were of DoD support to civil authorities.  Although focused at the local 
level, the results of the study brings into question why State civil authorities are not 
pushing information down to local EMs about DoD support.  The study concluded: 
The overall results of this exploratory study indicate some strong concerns 
about the DSCA process and its implementation from the viewpoint of 
EMs. The data indicates that…a majority of the EMs in this sample did 
not have a strong understanding of how this process works.237 
To drive the point home, the study included quotes from several local emergency 
managers that indicated a desire to know more about DSCA (previously referred to as 
MACA): 
It is obvious to me from this survey that I have much to learn and would 
appreciate any training (preferably local or regional) that could be offered. 
Being as I have never heard of it, perhaps it should be publicized more? 
Truthfully, I am not very familiar with the MACA, but would appreciate 
the opportunity to learn more. 
Please provide me with all information you can on the MACA. 
Prior to receiving this survey I was unaware of MACA even though we 
have utilized military assistance in the past. I think that additional training 
on this program is necessary.238 
Along with the need to build a collaborative relationship between DoD and State 
civil authorities, there is the desire by some States to do so.  Several State emergency 
management officials during phone interviews when asked about building increased ties 
with NORTHCOM/DoD made the below comments: 
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We need to close the gap between DoD and States, build trust and learn 
about how the system really works.239 
I think they [NORTHCOM/DoD] need to spend more time with State 
authorities.  At a minimum they should meet the Governor, the Adjutant 
General, and the State Emergency Management Director.240 
DoD and States need to look at response gaps and how they plan on 
supporting the States.  They also need to understand how the Governor 
wants to plan for response in the State.241 
Emergency Management is about relationships.  NORTHCOM has a lot to 
offer, we just don’t know what.  Do they know the needs of the States 
when they come to assist us?242 
NORTHCOM/DoD needs to open more lines of communications with 
regards to the intentions of their response plans.243 
It’s important DoD understand the nuances of the States. It’s not going to 
work if they don’t know what to bring.  When they do come we expect 
them to work out of our State EOC.  Yes, we want more interaction with 
DoD.  We have been accredited by Emergency Management Accreditation 
Program (EMAP).  NORTHCOM needs to reach out and take a look at 
how we are doing business.244 
I think the ties that need to be built are educational ones, in which the 
ever-changing face of the military gets oriented to the states which they 
may have to support in a disaster. Training and familiarization with what 
already exists at the state and local levels in terms of capabilities will help  
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in shaping the force with appropriate complementary equipment, training, 
and force structure to maximize disaster response capabilities and the 
more traditional roles of the U.S. military.245 
The above State representatives made it clear that they wanted a better 
relationship and more outreach from DoD/USNORTHCOM.  However, not all State 
emergency management officials felt the same.  Some stated they were content with the 
current relationship.  Their comments are below: 
We are aware of what DoD/NORTHCOM has to offer, but there is no 
need to ramp up our relationship based on our state vulnerabilities, risk 
assessment, and the limitations we have due to our small State staff.  The 
relationship we have with DoD is appropriate.246 
We have a relationship with the DCO and that is sufficient for us.247 
Even though not all State civil officials expressed a desire to build increased 
relationships with DoD, it was clear that there is both a need and an overall desire for an 
increased relationship.  Unfortunately, there are currently few existing mechanisms aimed 
at fostering that relationship between DoD and State civil authorities.  The 
recommendations below are aimed at reducing that deficiency thereby ultimately 
contributing to a collaborative relationship that leads to improved DoD initial response 
when the next catastrophic disaster occurs. 
1. Recommendation: Expand Charter of Council of Governors so that It 
Focuses on More than DoD/National Guard Issues 
In March of 2007, the Commission on the National Guard and Reserves released a 
report that recommended changes to the National Guard and other reserve Components 
so that they could best meet the needs of United States national security.  The report 
examined proposals aimed at enhancing the status and institutional powers of the 
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National Guard Bureau and improving their resources and capabilities in regard to 
homeland missions.248 One report finding stated, “Governors do not have a formal 
mechanism to consult with the Department of Defense on decisions affecting the National 
Guard of their state, including how the National Guard is organized, manned, trained, 
equipped, and utilized.”249 The Commission recommended that Congress establish a 
bipartisan Council of Governors composed of 10 governors that would meet with and 
advise the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of Homeland Security, and the White 
House Homeland Security Council on matters related to the National Guard and civil 
support missions.  The Council of Governors main purpose would be to discuss issues of 
concern related to the National Guard, issues such as funding and resourcing.250 
The intended purpose of the Council of Governors should be expanded so that it 
considers more than National Guard issues.  The Council should be used as a mechanism 
that encourages a collaborative relationship between State Governors and senior DoD 
officials.  Catastrophic disaster response strategy, expectations, and DoD civil support 
issues should be topics of discussion during their meetings.  This would ensure issues that 
have continually resurfaced after each catastrophic disaster, such as request for assistance 
procedures, damage assessment capabilities, and DoD response planning, are resolved in 
ways both DoD and Governors concur with.  The Council could also be used as forum for 
Governors and DoD officials to come together after large DoD civil support events so 
that supported Governors could discuss what went right and what went wrong.  The 
Council of Governors should be DoDs executive level civil support that moves DoD and 
State civil authorities beyond the issue of control.  It should be the forum that enables 
both entities to place their differences aside and focus their efforts on ways to improve 
DoDs support for and response to the next catastrophic disaster. 
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2. Recommendation:  States and DoD Should Form a Catastrophic 
Disaster Response Partnership Initiative Headed by the National 
Emergency Management Association (NEMA) and USNORTHCOM 
DoD, through USNORTHCOM has an Interagency Coordination Directorate 
whose mission is to, “Facilitate the integration and synchronization of Interagency 
activities to ensure mutual understanding, unity of effort and full spectrum support to and 
from NORAD and USNORTHCOM.”  Their motto, as interagency coordination 
practitioners, is “When you need a friend, it is too late to make one.”251 One of the 
lessons they learned from Katrina was that, “Emergency preparedness and response has 
traditionally involved civil – military relationships … especially in catastrophic 
events.”252 During catastrophes, their main civil-military relationship will be with State 
civil authorities, yet their strategy for interagency coordination does not specifically 
target State civil authorities who will be responsible for response. 253 Currently, 
USNORTHCOM does not have a consolidated State engagement plan.  It has a Joint 
Forces Orientation State Engagement Program that it considers an “educational endeavor 
in collaboration with the NGB” in order to gain a mutual operational understanding and 
share information between the States and USNORTHCOM.254 Through this program 
USNORTHCOM reaches The State Adjutant Generals (TAG) and their National Guard 
units, but not civil authorities such as State emergency management (EM) directors or 
homeland security (HS) directors.  This is because only 19 of 50 States have TAGs filling 
EM and/or HS directors’ positions.255 
One way for DoD to improve its relationship with State civil authorities and reach 
all 50 State emergency management directors is to have USNORTHCOM form a 
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partnership initiate specifically with NEMA.  This could be done by forming a 
NORTHCOM/NEMA working group.  NEMA is “…the professional association of and 
for state emergency management directors.”  One of its missions is to, “Advance 
continuous improvement in emergency management through strategic partnerships, 
innovative programs, and collaborative policy positions.”256 Forming a working group 
would allow USNORTHCOM officials and emergency managers to gain a more holistic 
view of what States need and do not need and what DoD can and can not provide.  The 
working group would be able to directly work operational and strategic issues that 
focused on catastrophic response while at the same time act as a venue to elevate disaster 
response and support policy issues to the Council of Governors. 
The partnership between USNORTHCOM and NEMA would also assist in 
facilitating closing the knowledge and information gap between DoD and State civil 
authorities.  This is one area that still needs improving.  For example, during Hurricanes 
Andrew and Katrina slow damage assessment resulted in delayed disaster response.  On 
July 19, 2007, Acting Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Americas’ 
Security Affairs stated before a Congressional Committee that DoD had reengineered and 
improved the process for civil authorities to request disaster imagery and analysis.257 
However, months later when state emergency management officials from Nebraska, 
Minnesota, South Carolina, Michigan, Missouri, Pennsylvania, Washington, Florida, 
Illinois, and Oregon were asked: 
Does the State know about DoDs reengineered and improved process for 
civil authorities to request imagery and analysis?258 
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They all replied, they did not know about it or were not informed of it.  One State 
Emergency Management Director stated, “The State does not know about it.  In my 
opinion DoD has not advertised it or conducted any outreach.  I only found out about it 
recently because of TOPOFF.”259 
The working group could close the knowledge and information gap by 
encouraging top DoD civil support and State emergency management officials to attend 
conferences, seminars, and training events that have historically been attended by DoD or 
State civil authorities.  Army North (ARNORTH) has an online DSCA Phase I and in 
resident DSCA Phase II course that is currently attended by Federal employees.  Courses 
such as this could be expanded to allow State officials to attend.  In 2006, the National 
Association of Counties conducted a nationwide survey which included responses from 
564 counties.260 The study indicated that county emergency management staff had little 
training or experience with the military even though they were assigned the responsibility 
as part of their duties.  Only 26.5% indicated they had experience with military matters 
and 21.9% indicated they had training.261) 
Attendance and briefings at professional conferences such as the annual NEMA, 
annual State EM, and applicable USNORTHCOM conferences could also be facilitated by 
the working group; further improving the relationship between DoD and State civil 
authorities.  State Emergency Managers could speak at the DSCA Phase II Course and 
USNORTHCOM conferences.  High ranking DoD officials tasked with leading domestic 
civil support efforts during a catastrophe could be invited to speak at the National Governors 
Association, NEMA or Association of Mayors’ Annual Conference.  The working group will 
go a long way to ensure conferences such as April 4-6, 2006, NORTHCOM and 
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ARNORTH conference for Federal Coordinating Officers/Defense Coordinating Officers 
that focused on orientation and planning for 2006 severe weather season are expanded to 
include key State stakeholders, i.e. State Coordinating Officers.262 
3. Recommendation: Increase DoD Title 10 and State Civil Authority 
Liaison Support and Creation of Exchange Program 
A post Katrina Congressional report recommended that DoD and DHS should 
expand the presence DHS officials at USNORTHCOM and other commands and 
integrate them into planning, training, exercising, and responding to disasters.263 This 
recommendation was intended to address and overcome a finding in the same report that 
commented on the inadequate coordination between DoD and DHS during the initial 
response to Katrina.264 As of 2006, DoD had 65 personnel working in department level 
positions in DHS.  DoD also had senior military officers assigned to appropriate FEMA 
headquarters and DCOs assigned to each of the 10 FEMA regional offices.265  (CRS-4)  
This has strengthened the understanding and cooperation between DoD, DHS, and 
FEMA. 
A similar expansion should occur between DoDs Title 10 and State civil 
authorities. Currently, DoDs civil support liaison efforts have minimal focus at the State 
level.  They have active duty DCOs who are assigned to each FEMA regional office.  The 
DCOs are responsible to liaison with FEMA and validate any requests for DoD assistance 
before sending them to USNORTHCOM.266 Their primary responsibility is to work with 
FEMA and not to liaison with State officials.  The DoD position that is more directly 
                                                 
262Paul McHale, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense, Statement to The House of 
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25 May 2007, 5. 
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Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, 617. 
264 Ibid., 602. 
265 “Homeland Security: Evolving Roles and Missions for United States Northern Command,” 
Congressional Research Service, November 16, 2006 http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/RS21322.pdf 
accessed 18 August 2007, 5. 
266 “DoD DSCA Phase I: Defense Support of Civil Authorities Studies,” USARNORTH, 
https://www.usarnorth.org/public/index.cfm accessed 24 August 2007. 
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reasonable for coordinating with States is the Emergency Preparedness Liaison Officer 
(EPLO).  There are approximately 320 reserve/part time EPLOs that the DoD utilizes to 
interface between services, other agencies, and States to build relationships so that the 
DoD can better prepare for and respond to the needs of those entities when disaster 
strikes.267 There are Regional EPLOs (REPLO) and State EPLOs (SEPLO).  REPLOs 
provide liaison support with FEMA regional organizations while SEPLOs support the 
DCO and work with state emergency operation centers and National Guard Joint Forces 
Headquarters.268 Unfortunately, since EPLOs are reservists and serve part time, they are 
limited as to the types and amount of liaison functions they can provide. 
One recommendation to increase liaison support to States is for DoD to convert 
an appropriate number of REPLO positions into Title 10 positions.  These full time 
REPLOs would be assigned to each regional DCO.  Their primary responsibility would 
be to work with the emergency management director of each State within their area of 
responsibility to ensure that civil as well as National Guard disaster response leadership 
understood DoD capabilities, limitations, and civil support procedures.  On the same 
note, a full time REPLO could also review state and some local emergency management 
plans so that State and local risks, vulnerabilities, and limitations could be better 
understood by DoD Title 10 responders prior to a response.  Having fulltime REPLOs 
dedicated to building relationships with State civil authorities would also provide DoD an 
opportunity to train up and coming DCOs and future homeland defense leaders.   
Based on the productivity of and gains achieved by creating full time REPLOs, 
the States and DoD could expand the concept and create a DoD State civil authority 
exchange program.  This would provide DoD Title 10 and State personnel to gain 
knowledge, build relationships, gain trust, and close the civil support gap.  Assignments 
could last from 6 months to two years.  Currently only DHS and DoD personnel are 
participating in such programs even though the States and DoD have as much of a need, 
if not more, based on post Katrina control debates. 
                                                 
267 DSCA Phase I: Defense Support of Civil Authorities Studies,” USARNORTH. 
268 Department of Defense, Joint Publication 3-38, Civil Support, II-19,20. 
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D. CONCLUSION 
This thesis began by asking: what could be done to build a collaborative 
relationship between DoD and State civil authorities so that DoD Title 10 response can be 
improved for the next catastrophic event.  It emphasized the criticality of building that 
collaborative response relationship due to the potential for greater DoD Title 10 
involvement in domestic disaster response based on the ever increasing risk of future 
catastrophe.  The National Planning Scenarios, the 2007 National Intelligence Estimate, 
and data concerning natural disasters were examined to illustrate this point. 
It introduced four historical phases that traced the Federal military’s role in 
domestic disaster response.  Those four phases shed insight on the changing domestic 
response role of the Federal military and examined how and why the response 
relationship between the military and State civil authorities slowly transformed from 
collaboration to ambiguity contributing to DoDs eventual slow response to Hurricane 
Andrew.  This was done by analyzing the Federal military response to a variety of past 
disasters and by examining the impact legislative and doctrinal changes had made on the 
relationship over the years. 
DoD Title 10 initial response to Hurricane Andrew and Katrina was then 
examined to determine why the relationship between State civil authorities and DoD 
impacted DoDs initial response.  It was shown that though heroic, DoD initial response 
was slow in part due to the tenuous relationship between DoD and State civil authorities.  
Unfortunately, Post Katrina debates over the military’s role in disaster response worsened 
the relationship.  Those tensions tended to focus efforts more towards debating over who 
is in control if DoD responds rather than how to improve DoD response.  This debate 
began post Hurricane Andrew, resurfaced during Katrina, and intensified after Katrina. 
Fortunately, DoD, DHS, and the States have all taken monumental steps in 
improving disaster response and have spoken extensively about interagency coordination, 
cooperation, and relationship building.  DoD has partnered with DHS through 
USNORTHCOM and FEMA, FEMA has partnered with states, and all have partnered 
with the private sector.  However, DoD and State civil authorities have not focused on 
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partnering and building relationships with one another outside National Guard channels.   
This is despite Hurricane Andrew and Katrina proving it is just as important, if not more 
important for State civil authorities and DoD to have a strong relationship built on trust 
versus arguing over who will be in control of disaster response.  Without a strong 
collaborative relationship between DoD and State civil authorities there is an increased 
risk that: 
• Control versus cooperation will be the focus 
• State civil authorities will be hesitant to ask for immediate DoD Title 10 
assistance 
• The building of knowledge by both DoD and State civil authorities of each 
others response capabilities and limitations will not take place 
• Over the long term DoDs ability to anticipate preparing for and 
responding to the needs of the States will be diminished 
Although basic, the recommendations set forth in this thesis are intended to 
remove barriers and build a positive and productive relationship between DoD and State 
civil authorities.  Amending The Stafford Act to allow DoD and State civil authorities to 
work directly with one another for the purposes of strengthening catastrophic response 
will be a major step.  Expanding the purview of the Council of Governors will build trust 
and high level cooperation between DoD and State governors reducing hesitancy to use 
DoD assets and tensions over who’s in control.  A partnership initiative to build 
interagency cooperation between USNORTHCOM and State civil authorities will 
provide both parties an improved ability to anticipate needs and requirements in the event 
of a catastrophe.  Finally, increasing DoD Title 10 liaison support to State civil 
authorities will improve knowledge, planning, exercise coordination, and training 
specifically targeted towards accounting for the expectations and needs of each state.  
Combined, the recommendations set forth in this thesis will be a start towards building a 
collaborative relationship between DoD and State civil authorities.  This will shift the 
focus from debates over control to creating partnerships leading to improved DoD initial 
response for the next catastrophic disaster. 
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